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programs in developing countries. Copies of the paper are available free from the World Bank, 1818 H
Street NW,  Washington,  DC 20433.  Please contact  Otilia Nadora,  room S6-065,  extension  31091
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In reviewing World Bank evaluations of the  comparator. Two more widely used comparators
impact of population projects, Baldwin explains  for family planning are trends (comparing
the nature and uses of four families of perfor-  current with past performance) and international
mance indicators. Two measure inputs:  performance (an extemal comparison). Baldwin
recommends strengthening the Bank's use of
Projecs implementation indicators, which  world ("successful developing country") stan-
are project-specific, are the principal measures  dards and of trend analysis rather than increasing
used in Bank supervision. They measure success  its use of target setting.
in creating sources capable of conducting certain
desired activities.  The Bank's primary interest is normally the
performance of the borrower's  national program,
Process (or activity) indicators measure  so more attention should be given to program-
performance of a project's  intended activities but  level than to project-level performance - except
tell nothing about the "yield" or output of those  for pilot projects.
activities.
Baldwin recommends:
And two measure  output:
A That the Bank standardize its terminology
Performance (or intermediate-output)  about these four families of indicators.
indicators measure the yield or output-perfor-  o That the Population and Human Resources
mance of a project or program. For family  DMpartment  periodically prepare comparator
planning, the principal indicator in this category  tables and graphs for use in Bank project and
is acceptor figures, normally with detaiis about  sector reports.
methods used plus the age, parity, and geo-  - That the Bank discontinue Project Perfor-
graphical distribution of acceptors. Quality may  mrance  Audit Reports on population projects, as
or may not be good and coverage may or may  they seldom add much to information and
not be comprehensive. These indicators do not  judgments contained in Project Completion
directly measure ultimate demographic impacts  Reports. The money saved could be applied to
-lower  fertility and slower population growth.  more effective evaluation research.
o  That operational staff show more concern
Demographic outcome (or impact) indica-  for a program's  contraceptive mix.
tors do measure demographic impacts, usually  o That more attention be paid to a program's
the contraceptive prevalence rate and age-  service quality.
specific and total fertility rates.  *  That the use of demographic and health
surveys be the rule, not the exception, in Bank
One can use a desired value of any compara-  population and health projects.
tor as a target, but a target is only one possible
The  Policy  ResearchWorking  Paper  Seriesdissemninates  the  findings  of work  under  way  in  theBank.  Anobjectiveof  the series
is to get these findings  out quickly,  even if presentations  are less than fully polished.  The findings, interpretations,  and
conclusions  in these  papers  do not necessarily  represent  official  Bank  policy.
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George B. Baldwin
vExecutive  Summary
This paper reviews  how the Bank has evaluated  the impact of its population  projects,
with mecific  reference  to its use of targets as a performance  standard. The review  is based on a
reading  of the appraisal reports for all 75 population  projects since the Bank entered the field in
1970,  the 17 available  Project Performance  Audit Reports  (PPARs)  on completed  projects,  external
reviews  of the Bank's  approach  to performance  evaluation,  plus  one authoritative  outside  commentary
on the subject. This documentary  review  has been supplemented  by talks with Bank and outside
population  experts.
The review  consists  of three  parts: (1) a main  text  of 22 pages  that discusses  the nature
of targets  and indicators,  provides  a conceptual  framework,  and offers  a set of six recommendations;
(2) a 21-page  annex  (Annex  II) that summarizes  the use of targets  and impact  indicators  in each of
the SARs; and (3)  a seven-page summary  of what the more  important  PPARs  have had to say on
performance  monitoring.
A simple flow-diagram  model provides a conceptual  framework  for identifying  and
labeling  four families  of performance  indicators. Two measure  inputs,  two outputs. The suggested
categories  are:
Inputs
a.  Project  implementation  indicators
b.  Process, or activity,  indicators
Outputs
c.  Performance,  or intermediate-output,  indicators,  and
d.  Demographic  outcome,  or impact,  indicators
Project implementation indicators  are project-specific,  self-contained  within project
boundaries,  and are the principal measures  used in Bank supervision  work.  Project cost and
implementation  schedules  constitute  the main  implementation  targets,  and are often  supplemented  by
other implementation  activities (e.g., recruitment  and training of manpower). For our purposes,
implementation  indicators  are the least  important  of the four types: they  measure  success  in creating
new resources  capable  of conducting  certain  desired  activities.
Process indicators  measure the performance  of a project's intended activities  (clinic
sessions held, patients attending,  contraceptive  supplies distributed,  training courses conducted,
broadcasts  aired, film-showings  presented,  etc.). Process  indicators  tell us nothing  about  the "yield"
or output  of those activities.
Performance indicators  measure the yield or output-performance  of a FP project or
program.  The principal  indicator in this category is acceptor  figures, normally with details of
methods  used, plus the age, parity, and geographical  distribution  of acceptors. These  figures  come
from program  service  statistics. The quality  may  or may not be good  and the coverage  may  or may
not be comprehensive  (e.g., is the private sector included?). A key characteristic  of intermediate-
output  indicators  is that they provide  no direct measurement  of ultimate  demographic  impacts,  i.e.,
lower fertility and slower population  growth.  For that we need an additional  set, of outcome2  Targets and Indicators In Bank Popula4on Projects
indicators  ("impact  indicators');  the main  ones are the Contraceptive  Prevalence  Rate' and the Age-
Specific  and Total  Fertility  Rates. The Natural  Rate of Increase  and  the rate of population  growth
are bottom-line  measures  of demographic  outcomes,  but since  they depend  on death rates as much
as on birth rates they cannot  be used as indicators  of reproductive  behaviour  and outcomes.
It is possible  to use a desired  value  of any indicator  as a target. But a target is only one
possible  comparator.  Two more  widely  used eP comparators  are trends (comparison  with own  past
performance)  and international performance (an external  comparison). Indeed,  where targets  are
used they are invariably  set with reference  to either or both of those two comparators.  Thus it is the
latter which are the "primary  reference  points" for setting  targets  and judging  performance  in any
FP program. Indeeo, it is the development  of international  standards  of fertility  and contraceptive
use, and historical  rates of movement  towards desired levels of these, that underlie all impact
performance  judgments.  Trend analysis  simply measures  how successfully,  or rapidly, one is
approaching  international  standards. It is for these  reasons  that the review's  recommendations  focus
on strengthening  the use of world (=successful  LDC) standards and of trend analysis  instead of
making  greater  use of target-setting.
Since  the Bank's  primary  interest  will normally  be in the performance  of the borrower's
national  program,  much  more  attention  should  normally  be given  to program-level  performance  than
to project-level  performance. Trying  to make  the project the primary interest makes  sense only if
a project  can be regarded  as an experimental  pilot project  whose  results will need evaluation  to see
if the project design should  be generalized  within the national  program, or used elsewhere. Few
population  projects  are of this type (mainly  the minority  of geographically  distinct,  or area, projects).
The activities  of most are so commingled  with a national  program  that it is hopeless  to try to link
project inputs to  project outputs;  we are normally  linking  project inputs to program outputs. So
while  project-based  "process  indicators"  may  be feasible,  indicators  of intermediate  and final-outcome
indicators  will usually  be feasible  only at program  level.
The review finds that the Bank has done a generally  good job in using intermediate
output targets, often as a technical  assistance  service to help governments  set realistic program
targets. Where  targets  and quantitative  indicators  have  not been  used, there  is usually  a good  reason.
A caution  is stated  that performance  against  project  output  targets, while sometimes  useful, should
not be expected  to carry the main burden  of assessing  project success  in this sector.
The review  finds Bank  practice  in using targets  and indicators  sensible  and pragmatic,
although  not immune  from some of the  confusion  and inconsistency  that marks the handling  of these
issues in all population agencies.  In addition to suggesting  the four families of performance
indicators, the review makes six recommendations  for improving Bank practice in  evaluating
population  operations. They are:
a.  An effort should be made to standardize  Bank terminology,  using the flow-
diagram model  and the four families  of indicators  derived  from it.
'Strictly speaking,  this should be classed with the 'performance'  or intemediate-output group.  However, a robust
CPR figure provides such strong evidence of fertility  impact that it can be regarded *as ir  it were a direct fertility
measure.  Tbe survey data on which it rests are much closer to those used in establishing fertility estimates than ta those
used for estimating intermediate outputs (mainly service statistics).F.ecucie  awnmaly  3
b.  PHN should  prepare,  periodica1ly,  -i set of comparator  graphs  and tables  for use
in Bank project  and sector  reports.
c.  Operational  staff should  show stronger  concern for a program's  contraceptive
mix, both at the stage  of project design  a1d in assessing  program  performance.
d.  More attention  should  be devoted  to measuring  a program's  service quality,  a
dimension  that has recently  begun  to receive  increased  attention  by population
professionals.
e.  The use of Demographic  and Health  Surveys  (DHS)  should  be the rule, not the
exception,  in Bank  population  and health projects.
f.  Since few PPARs add much to the information  and judgments  contained  in
Project Completion  Reports (PCRs), the Bank should consider  discontinuing
them for population  projects. The resulting savings  could be used for more
productive  forms of evaluation  research.I.  Introduction
This paper  reviews  past and current Bank  practice  in "setting  targets and evaluating  the
impact of Bank population  projects."  The purpose is to provide background  'for an eventua!
experiment  with introducing  specific  impact  indicators  into  one or more  Bank  projects." The review,
it is hoped, may lead to recommendations  "for improving  target setting and impact evaluation,
drawing  ...  on Bank  staff suggestions,  experience  in other agencies,  and the research  literature  in
the area."
The review combines  quantitative  and qualitative data in ways which seem most
responsive  to PHN's main interests  in targets  and ccpost project  evaluations.  With  PHN agreement,
I have recast the assignment's  formal  Terms  of Reference  into the foUowing  three tasks:
... TeU  us what we have done in the past,
... Tell us what you think of past practice,  and
... Tell us what you think  we should  do in the future.
This approach  explains  the inclusion  of Annexes  II and Im (summaries  of how  targets  and indicators
have been used in Bank reports, and of internal critical reviews by the Operations  Evaluation
Department)  as the main  evidence  on which  the discussion  rests. This documentary  review  has been
supplemented  by discussions  with experienced  population  professionals  in the Bank, plus a few
outsiders  currently  conducting  similar  reviews.
II.  Targets  and Indicators
It is useful to maintain  a distinction  between "targets"  and "indicators." 2 Operational
Directive 10.70 has a suggestive  footnote  which defines  an indicator  as 'a  measure . . . which
indicates  movement  towards,  or away from, an agreed project  target."  This need not be the case,
however. An indicator  can better be regarded  as a measure  of performance  to be used against  some
comparator-not necessadly  a target. An equaly common  comparator  is past performance,  i.e. the
use of indicators  to reveal trends.  Another  common  comparator  is the level of selected  indicators
in other  countries,  i.e. international  performance  standards.  Without  good  indicators,  no comparisons
are possible;  with them, many kinds are possible. To focus on targets is to limit attention  to a
narrower  set of problems  than is covered  by indicators. This paper is concerned  with both.
The Universe of Projects
Since  entering  the population  field  in 1970  the Bank  has made  75 loans  or credits,  to 42
countries. Annex  I lists these  operations  alphabetically  by country,  giving  the project  name  as shown
on the Staff  Appraisal  Report (SAR),  the date, and the size of the loan/credit. The list does not
include aUl  PHN projects since the Bank entered this field: there have been 40-.50  Health and
Nutrition  projects  that have not had demographic  or family  planning  as an explicit  objective; 2 such
projects  have been excluded. The 75 projects  which have  had Population  and family  planning  as a
primary, explicit  objective  constitute  something  under two-thirds  of all PHN projects.
2Note also the distinction betwen  'targets'  and 'targeting',  the former referring to the setting of numerical
performance goals, the latter to specific groups or areas to be served. This  paper is concerned with target-setting, not
targeting.TargeLu  and  Indicators  5
There is no pattern or consistency  to the names  given  to Population  projects. Some  are
indeed  called  "Population  Projects";  others include  "Health"  or 'Family  Welfare"  or some other  term
in the title. The word "Population"  appears  in the title of 53 of the 75 ARs but in half  the cases the
word is accompanied  by one or more other descriptors,  e.g.,  "Health," "Family  Welfare," etc.
These variations  have litt!e  significance  and can be ignored. They  reflect  the fact that Governments
(or Bank staff) in countries  where Population  is a particularly  sensitive  topic often prefer a more
diplomatic  project  title, or the fact that Population  objectives  are normally  pursued,  in large part, by
offeriDng  family planning  services  through the health-delivery  system, especially  the Maternal and
Child  Health  (MCH)  part of the system. Since  Population  is only one among  many  objectives  of any
health system, a project that is not a single-purpose  Population  project must deal with multiple
objectives  and will have  multiple  achievement  criteria, indicators,  or targets. This does not present
any particular  difficulty  in reviewing performance  on the population  objective,  however.
Table 1 shows the number of projects approved3  during each five-year  period since
1970:







1990  to 5/91  14
Total  75
There  was a major  acceleration  in Population  projects  after 1984.  Since  the typical  project  lasts  about
five  or six years, and it takes  another  year or more  to write  a Project  Completion  Report  (PCR),  we
can expect  to find PCRs  only from the set of 31 projects  approved  in 1984  or earlier. PCRs (which
are required  of all projects)  and Project Performance  Audit Reports  (PPARs,  done only on a small
sample of projects) are not the only source of information  on project performance,  however.'
Equally  or more  informative,  usually,  are comments  on program  performance  to be found  in repeater
projects.
The Bank  has done  one or more  repeater  projects  in 18 countries.  The 30 repeaters,  plus
their 18 initial  projects,  give  us 48 projects  that occur n some kind of sequence.  This is almost  two-
thirds of the total.  In 11 of the 18 countries  the sequence  consists of only one initial and one
repeater  project;  but in seven  countries  there have  been  three or more  projects  (India  has had seven,
Indonesia  five, Bangladesh  and Kenya four, and Jamaica,  Malawi,  and Nigeria three each). In 15
of the 18 repeater  countries  there is a current  project under implementation;  in only three countries
has a repeater  sequence  been  abandoned  so that no  n:.,tinuing  project  exists (Egypt,  Malaysia,  and
'StWictly  spaking,  classification  is based  on the dats appearing  on  gry-cover  SARs.
*Th laes OED  catalogue  of OED  reports  (September,  1991)  lisu 14 Ptoject  Completion  Reports  (PCRs)  and 17
Performance  Audit  Reports  (PARs)  for the  population  sector.  The  lised PCRs  mean  that  no PARs  wero  done on those
project; the  listed  PARs  normally  attach  the relevant  PCR as an annex.6  Targets  and  Indicators  in Bank  Population  ProJects
the Philippines). In two countries  with repeater  projects (Jamaica  and Tunisia)  there was a clear
interruption  in the sequence;  but in the other 16 repeater  countries  the sequences  appear  to have  been
unbroken  and to be continuing  to the present. Nine  of the 31 projects  signed  before  1984  turned  out
to be "one off"  or non-repeated  projects,  presumably  reflecting  either Government  or Bank  reluctance
to go forward  with a second  project. (Most  single  projects  signed  in 1985  or later are still disbursing
and little can be said about  repeater  projects  among  them.)
m. Principal  Indicators  for Measuring  Population  Performance
The Bank's  main  objective  in Population  has always  been  to slow  its growth  so per capita
incomes  can grow faster, without the drag of a high population  growth that eats up much of a
country's growth in GNP.  Bringing  the personal benefits  of family planning  (FP) to individual
couples  and their children  has not been  the primary  objective. Thus the main  test of project success
is its contribution  to slowing  population  growth.  That, however, must be a long-term measure,
revealed by censuses or sample surveys.  In the shorter term, population  growth may actually
accelerate,  even in the face of a good  population  program. This is because  mortality  rates may  drop
faster  than birth rates,  depending  on where a country  is in the demographic  transition  (the  historical,
world-wide  transition  from  a high birth-rate/high  death-rate  pattern to a low birth-rate/low  death-rate
pattern).  So while a falling population  growth rate is certainly encouraging,  a stable or even
accelerating  rate is not necessarily  a mark of failure.
A more revealing  demographic  indicator  of program  success  is what is happening  to
fertility  (i.e., forget  about  the death rate). If fertility  is declining,  the program  must be succeeding
(this assumes  that program-offered  PP and motivation  activities  are a major  source  of failing  fertility,
as they normally  are). There are four fertility  measures  commonly  used and frequently  encountered
in Bank SARs:
The Total Fertility  Rate CMR)
the Crude Birth Rate (CBR)
Age-Specific  Ferfility  Rates (ASFR),  and
The Net Reproduction  Rate (NRR)
These terms are explained in the summary definitions on the inside cover of this review.  Census
analyses  can provide  numbers  for all four of these  indicators;  but censuses  are infrequent,  analyses
are often delayed,  and census  quality  not always reliable. So better numbers  are often  provided  by
special  sample  surveys. The key indicator  is the  TFR, which  tells us how  many  births a woman  will
have  over her lifetime  if she follows  the reproductive  experience  which  women  in defined  age-groups
are currently  experiencing. Thus if a survey shows  that women 15-19,  20-24, etc. are having,  on
average,  x, y, etc. number  of children,  then  it is easy to aggregate  the age-specific  births to see how
many  an average  woman  will  have  throughout  her reproductive  years. Advocates  of 'zero population
growth"  want to see the TFR fail to about  2.1: this implies  (with  some allowance  for non-marriage)
that each woman will have one daughter, i.e., will just reproduce  her own reproductive  capacity,
over her lifetime.  That represents  a Net Reproduction  Rate of 1.0, a steady-state  demographic
condition  (population  does not stop  growing  when  a NRR  of 1.0 is reached,  since  increasing  numbers
of women  will be entering  their reproductive  years. Only  when this historical  momentum  has been
worked  off will population  growth  gradually  fail to zero).Principal  indcatorsfor measuring  population  performane  7
TFRs  can be derived  only from ASFR  data, actual  or assumed. Since  only actual  trends
ate of interest  for judging  program  performance,  such indioators  become  available  only as often as
surveys  can  be conducted. These  are rarely  done more  frequently  than every  few years, at best (they
are rarely conducted  on any regular  basis-usually when  some donor  presses  for them and offers  to
fund them). At best, a few years must pass between  successive  calculations  of the TFR; at worst,
we get one figure  and never  a second  or a third or a fourth.
So demographic  indicators  are too spread  out in time to provide  current information  on
how people are responding  to population  programs.  For that we must turn to data on program
"acceptors." If we have reasonable  detail on FP users, it is possible  to convert such figures  into
estimates  of the demographic  measures  reviewed  above. Thus FP acceptor  data  provide  much  more
current  and useful  data on program  performance  than are available  from demographic  surveys  and
censuses. They are also the main source  of data needed  to "fine  tune" any program.
The principal  "acceptor"  indicators  are these:
a.  The total number of current acceptors (=users  of FP)  for a  government
program,  outside  the government  program,  by contraceptive  method
b.  New  acceptors  (e.g.  ,per month,  per year)  government  plus non-government,  by
method
c.  Continuation  rates (or their complement,  dropout  rates: 100 acceptors  minus
dropouts = continuing  acceptor  rate).
d.  The contraceptive  prevalence  rate (CPR) 5
Acceptor  data come  from the service  statistics  of FP clinics  and hospitals. They should  be reflected
in individual  patient  records, so  that special  analyses  could  generate  figures  by age  group, PP method
used, and other characteristics. Most service-statistics  reports are based on  programs alone,
however, with no regular reporting on acceptors in the private sector (the significance  of that
omission  will vary greatly from country  to country,  among regions within countries, and within
countries  as  the  balance  shifts  between  government and  the  main  private  service-
providers-pharmacies, physicians, and  non-government organizations.  Although private,
community-based  distributors  are normally tied in to the government  reporting system).  Gross
acceptor  figures  mean relatively  little;  acceptor  figures  by method  mean  considerably  more; but only
acceptors  by method,  combined  with continuation  rates, can  provide  good  estimates  of "couple  years
of protection"  (CYP).  One then needs to com pare such figures,  by age groups, with the fertility
of unprotected  couples  in the same  age groups, to arrive at good estimates  of how strongly  FP is
affecting  fertility.
For projecting demographic  trends, the Contraceptive  Prevalence  Rate (CPR) is a
considerably  more significant  figure than acceptor figures.  Taken with information  about the
proportions  using different  methods  (which  have different  birth-prevention  effectiveness),  the CPR
permits estimates  of how many  births are being averted  during a particular  period (but only fairly
'A fifth measure is 'Couple Years of Protection.'  This measure applies weights (based on the estimated effectiveness
of each contraceptive method) to the total number of uSers, based on the estimated numbers using each method. USAID
mackes  considerable use of this indicator, but Bank  staff, after some use in early projects,  arely if ever use it today.8  TargeLs  and Indicators  in Bank Population  Projects
crude  estimates,  unless  continuation  rates  are known). This allows  estimates  of the CBR  and, if the
ages of acceptors  are known,  of TFRs. CPRs  are not generated  by service  statistics,  however;  they
require  special  surveys  (occasionally  they can be "piggy-backed"  onto  other surveys,  but most  often
they must be conducted  on their own).
There is a rule-of-thumb,  often  cited by the late Dr. Barney  Berelson,  the former head
of The Population  Council, that a 30 percent acceptance  rate is typically  matched  by a CBR of
30-the  "30/30  rule.  "  This loose relationship  is linked  to another  CPRICBR  rule-of-thumb,  namely,
that a one percentage-point  rise in the CPR generates  an approximately  equal  fall in the CBR (this
relationship  holds only for the mid-ranges  of the two variables). So if a weak, early-stage  FP
program  has a CPR of under five  percent, and the CBR is above  50, then a 25-point  movement  in
each rate will find  them crossing  at about  30.
The above review  correctly  suggests  that demographic  and acceptor  indicators  can be
used to infer one from the other, in a loose way. Thus demographers  who make  projections  about
a country's  future  fertility  and the size  of its population  can  translate  these  projections  into  CPR rates
implicit in those projections. And they can make statements  about  the annual numbers  of new
acceptors, and their continuation  rates, that will be compatible  with a given CPR.  A great many
assumptions  will be necessary,  with possible  alternative  values  capable  of producing  the same  result
(e.g., a slow build-up  of acceptors  but with high continuation  rates vs. high numbers  of acceptors
with lower  continuation  rates). Similarly,  demographers  can  begin  with  acceptor  data and, if the  data
are good enough (e.g., with totals, ASFR by method, and dropout rates) infer future trends in
fertiity and population  growth. Ideally  what is wanted  are direct, frequently-cowlected  demographic
data that provide  hard evidence  on what is happening. But few countries  collect  demographic  data
on an ideal pattern, so governments  and researchers  must draw on whatever demographic  and
acceptor  data are available,  see if they appear compatible,  and draw reasonable  inferences  about
demographic  trends.
One further  comment  about  the linkage  between  demographic  and acceptor  indicators.
If FP were the only variable  influencing  fertility,  then  there would  be a 100  percent linkage;  changes
in acceptors  and FP methods  would  explain 100  percent  of any changes  in fertility,  and vice versa.
No such tight linkage exists, of course.  However,  where the age of marriage,  the prevalence  of
marriage,  and the mores of extra-marital  intercourse  are all relatively  stable, then there is a high
linkage and fertility rates can be explained  largely by changes  in the numbers  of acceptors,  their
continuation  rates, and the methods  they use.  The literature almost invariably  cites FP as the
principal  explanation  of falling  fertility;  it is not  uncommon  to see FP cited  as explaining,  e.g., 'two-
thirds of the drop in ferdlity.  " The more  difficult  questions  concern  why  BP is or is not increasing,
i.e. demand-side  questions. Almost  all national  programs,  and Bank  projects, contain  components
designed to  increase the  demand for  FP  (these are  normally the  Information-Education-
Communication,  or IEC, components.  Longer-term  approaches  to increasing  demand  for FP include
wider education  for girls, increasing  women's employment  opportunities,  and the introduction  of
incentives  or privileges  for smaller families).
In summary: demographic  and acceptor  data  are the two  sets of outcome  indicators  that
allow  judgments  on how well population  programs are working. Demographic  statistics are the
ultimate  indicators  but are generated  much  less regularly,  and are much  more costly,  than acceptor
data generated  by service statistics.  Both have important  roles to play in providing  insight into
program  performance.  Both  can serve  as complementary  program  targets. But  largely  for pragmatic
reasons  of cost and availability,  acceptor  data normally  offer a more current, more operationallyf*w4alndicatorafor  measuring  popudaion  perfomance  9
useful source of outcome targets than the longer-term,  ultimate authority of demographic  data.
There is a difficulty,  however: the demographic  output data that are the ultimate indicators  of
progress  are rarely if ever available  on a project basis (either  geographically  or time-wise). If one
wants  output  data geared  to a project, the most one can hope for are acceptor  data (even  those are
sometimes  cast only in program,  not project, terms).
The question arises whether program outcome targets are more useful for judging
project performance  than  another kind of data, namely, project input targets (e.g., facilities
constructed  and put into  service,  staff  recruited  and trained, new  PP methods  introduced,  workshops
held, IEC materials  produced  and distributed,  intended  studies  completed,  the service  statistics  system
improved,  policies reviewed  and announced,  agreed operating  budget levels reached, etc.).  The
provision  of these hardware  and software  inputs constitutes  the "system-building"  which is often  a
primary  objective  of Bank  projects. The creation  of such  motivational  and service-delivery  systems
is especially  important  during the early years of any program.' Later, making  the system  perform
effectively  ("organizational  development,"  in one sense)  is likely  to become  of greater  concern. A
major  conclusion  of this review  is that input  indicators  deserve  to be rescued  from the infra  dig limbo
into which  they have fallen and should  be used, for project  performance  targeting,  in tandem  with
program  output  indicators.
Up to now  I have  discussed  targets  solely  in terms  of demographic  outcomes  or acceptor
statistics which suggest demographic  outcomes.  This perspective is  too  narrow, however.
Something  like one half of all "population  projects"  are in fact health projects  where PP services,
and demographic  objectives,  play a distinctly  subordinate  role.  Such project design may reflect
Government  sensitivity  in addressing  population  questions  more directly,  or a greater interest in
health than in population  objectives  on the part of particular  Bank  staff, or a sensible  judgment  that
improved  health indicators  may be a precondition  of changed  attitudes  towards  family  size. In any
event, we must recognize  that in many  health projects  non-population  objectives  will be dominant
and the primary  targets  will be health not population  indicators. There may  be no population  targets
at all; indeed, there may have been staff  judgments  that to set any kind of population  or acceptor
targets would  have stirred resistance  and been  counter-productive.
IV.  Comparators: Projections,  Targets,  Trends and 'Other Places"
Appraisal  reports routinely  present demographic  projections  in addition to whatever
targets  they may  contain. These  are entirely  independent  exercises  and should  not be confused. The
PHN Demographic  Unit, using a standard  projection  model, prepares  projections,  every year, for
about 190 countries.  These projections  use as their starting values  recent estimates  of fertility,
mortality,  and migration. Not infrequently,  Bank operating  divisions request PHN to construct
alternate-scenario  projections  to ilustrate how  population  growth  would  behave  assuming  faster, or
slower,  declines  in fertility  and mortality  than are assumed  in the single-valued  annual  projections.
'Note the following  (footnote)  from  OED's 1991  survey  of the Bank's  population  assistance  to eight  countries: 'In
countries  just beginning  to build  a population  program,  a necessary  first step is to create  a delivery  system  and the
institutional  capacity  to operate  it. This in itself,  is likely  to be sufficiendy  difficult  and time  consuming  that several
projects  could  usefully  be devoted  exclusively  to that. The  Bank  has effoctively  heped with the physical  aspects  of the
delivery  aystm ...  but not so effectively  with the institutional  aspes.  I  (Noulation  and the World  Bank:  A Review  of
Activities  and Imnacts  from Eight  Case  Studies,  OED  Report  No. 10021,  October  22, 1991,  p. 66.)10  Targets  and Indicators  in Bank Popzdaton  Projects
The resulting "high, low, medium" projections are used fairly frequently in PHN and other Bank
reports.
Projections  are arithmetic exercises that are neutral with respect to what  "ought to
happen." Targets are not  neutral; they are normative and announce goals that managers and staff
will try to achieve.  They exercise a hortatory psychological influence intended to elicit a more
successful outcome than would be attained without them.  They may even be viewed as "quotas,"
with corrupting effects on service quality and on service statistics.  Demographic targets are usuaUy
set at  a national level; at  that level they have little operational impact and typically need to  be
translated  (through the  linkage relationships discussed above) into acceptor targets of increasing
specificity as one moves down in program levels from the national to that of individual service-
points.  Target-setting  is  of  course  a  tricky  business  that  must  find  the  high  ground  of
encouragement, credibility, and challenge and avoid the discouragement  and cynicism that come with
targets that few people believe can be achieved.  While everyone feels good when targets are met
or exceeded, and bad when performance falls short, evaluators of performance must worry about the
reasonableness of the targets as well as about performance in meeting them.
In addition to comparing program performance with projections (a long-run comparison)
and with targets (a short-term comparison) two other types of comparison are possible-(i)  trend
analysis,  or  comparing  current performance with the  past,  and  (ii) comparing  country or  area
performance with that of other countries or areas.  Trend analysis is perhaps the most important
standard of all,  since it compares "facts"  with "facts" (current and past performance) within the
same socio-cultural setting (impossible when the geographical areas are widely different).
Projections, targets, trends, and geographical comparisons are not alternatives.  They
are complementary and additive, in the sense that they all add something to our understanding of a
country's demographic situation.  But international comparisons and trend analysis are particularly
usefil  standards for judging project or program performance.
V.  The Use of Targets  in Bank Projects: The Record
Table I is based on Annex II.  It shows the frequency with which 11 target-related topics
appear in Bank projects in each of the 42 countries covered by our universe of 75 SARs.  Before
turning  to  the  table,  a  few words  of explanation and  caution are  in order.  First:  the list  of
charatristics  is somewhat fuzzy, imprecise, and arbitrary.  Several of the characteristics combine
a number of closely-related indicators which, if separated out for individual recording, would greatly
complicate the table,  make it more difficult to understand, and would add Uttle  to our objective of
reporting the kind of targeting used in Bank projects.  Second:  the footnotes should be read in
conjunction with the labels put on the 11 "characteristics  ."  Third:  the "scoring" has been done by
countries, not by projects, i.e.,  if a country has had more than  one project, all of them have been
treated as if they were in fact a single project for that country.  This loses any sense of evolution
within successive country projects, but that can be found in Annex II if anyone needs that degree of
detail.  Fourth:  Table I is a summary of a working table which showed how each country scored
on  these 11 characteristics.  No table showing how individual countries scored on each of these
characteristics is shown for the simple reason that the country summaries in Annex II  are felt much
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Table 2.  Types of TWrgeting/Evaluation  Prdvisions Found In Population Lending to  42
Countries
Characteristics  Countries
a.  No demography  or family  planning  targets  15
b.  Government  to form/announce  population  policy  S
c.  Main objective  is to create  a functioning  health-delivery  syst m (targets  premature)  9
d.  Bank  evaluation  of government  demographic  targets and acceptor  requirements  20
e.  Target CPR specified  21
f.  Government  obligated  to do key surveys  (CPR, KAP, ASFR)  14
g.  MIS to be improved  (especially  service  statistics)  6
h.  Mid-term  or other project evaluation  exercise  8
i.  Demographic  data-base  to be improved  4
j.  Upgrade  institutional  capacity  to do operational  research  9
k.  Targets  for acceptors,  by method  8
Notes on each characteristic
a.  Self-explanatory.  But in all such countries  FP services  are offered  in the government  MCH
system.  Reflects  either sensitivity  or uselessness  of setting targets in a system  just getting
organzed.
b.  Found  where government  is offering  FP services  and has shown  willingness  to adopt  a formal
population  policy.
c.  Self-explanatory  (see a above).
d.  Here the Bank analyzes  the consistency  between a government's  national  demographic  and
program acceptor targets (or translates the former into the latter).  The result is almost
invariably a  set of demographic  and acceptor targets agreed as  reasonable between the
government  and the Bank.
e.  A target contraceptive  prevalence  rate (usually  set by government  and accepted  or modified  by
the Bank)  is the single  most common  target used.
f.  A common  complaint  in Bank reports is that the CPR is not known. So a common  project
component  is a requirement  that such surveys  be undertaken  at one or more points during a
project's life.
g.  improving  the Management  Information  System (MIS), especially  the system of PP service
statistics,  is a fairly common  component,  to permit better program  monitoring.
h.  Several  projects  (probably  more  than  indicated)  use a mid-term  evaluation  procedure  to monitor
performanoe. The criteria  to be used  by such  teams  are almost  never spelled  out (i.e., they are
left to the teams themselves).
i.  Where  basic  demographic  data are especially  weak, projects  may fund activities  to collect  and
analyse  such data.
j.  Several projects push for doing operational  research studies, but often need to strengthen
organizations  that can do them.
k.  It is almost as important  to know the distribution  of acceptors by method  as to know their
overall number. A fair number  of projects  have set acceptor  targets in terms of contraceptive
methods.
Strictly speaking,  only items a, d, e, and k involve  target-setting (item b implicitly  involves
targets  as well). Item c involves  the establishment  of pre-conditions  before  targets become  possible
or meaningful. But all the other five characteristics  (items e to i) are concerned  with creating  the
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past performance,  or against  other, less objective  criteria). Targets  are meaningless  unless  current
performance  data also exist.  So projects  have often been  concerned  not only with targets but also
with generating performance  data for making  target comparisons.
Comments on the table
The following  observations  are suggested:
In over one-third  of the countries,  the SARs  make  no mention  of either demographic  or
FP targets.  Most  of these countries  are in Africa  or Latin America,  where population-control  and
FP have only recently  been accepted  as government  objectives,  and where the subject  is often still
sensitive. So FP goes forward, invariably  as one of many  MCH services,  but without  any targets.
In four or five  countries  with more  than one project  one can see an evolution  from no targets  to some
kind of targets (the 15 "no target" countries  do not include  those countries).
The single  most common  target,  found in exactly  half the countries,  is the contraceptive
prevalence  rate (CPR).
Used almost  as frequently  as the CPR (in 20 of the 42 countries)  are demographic  and
acceptor  targets, almost invariably  linked.  The Bank has done a lot of "consistency  testing" of
demographic  targets  (always  set by the government,  not the Bank)  to see how  many  acceptors  would
be required  to meet  the demographic  targets. Such  analyses  were  particularly  common  in the earlier
Bank  projects,  where  extended  annexes  on this subject  were  the rule. Such  analyses  are less common
today,  probably  because  the early borrowers  were countries with pressing  population  problems  and
where the subject  was not politicalty  or culturally  sensitive;  today,  there are many  more  projects  in
countries  which, while  wilting  to offer  FP/child  spacing  services,  are not yet willing  to talk in terms
of population  control and are therefore  reluctant  to set demographic  targets.
In over a fifth  of all countries  the Bank  is involved  in helping  a government  get its PHC
health  system  up and running. The earlier  the stage  of system  development,  the more primitive  the
institutional  base, the greater the manpower  shortages  and experience-the less relevant  seem the
setting  and monitoring  of PP targets (see fn. 4, p. 7). Tnat seems  a more plausible  explanation  for
the absence  of targets than assuming  Bank staff  just forgot to include  targets in the project.
In nearly one-fifth  of the countries projects have set acceptor targets in terms of
contraceptive  method mix.  Sometimes  these can be quite specific,  and are obviously  related to
decisions  that must be taken  on contraceptive  procurement.  But sometimes  the 'method" targets  are
quite general-e.g. reducing  an emphasis  on sterilizations  and giving  greater emphasis  to temporary
methods  (which  appeal  more  to younger  couples  who  have not yet  completed  their families). Often,
too, a  significant  number  of declared "acceptors"  or "users' (as revealed  by CPR surveys)  will
respond  that  they use the rhythm  or withdrawal  methods. The  effectiveness  of these  methods  is much
lower than the so-called "modern"  methods;  so there is often a detmination,  reflectd in target-
setting, to persuade  a higher proportion  of users to accept  one of the four or five more effective
methods-and to do this FP staff  need  to be given  the education  and pressure  which method-specific
targets can help provide.
Finally,  and most importantly:  this review  of aU  Bank  population  projects makes  clear
that the Bank has been deeply  involved  in target-setting  ever since it got into this sector. There is
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usefulness of  targets.  Some understandable confusion among  inexperienced staff assigned  to
population projects, and the innocence of managers who may never have worked in the sector, may
be the main sources of doubt about how energetically the Bank has used target-setting for evaluating
project performance.  In my view, however, what the Bank needs more than greater use of targeting
more thinking and  discussion on  how target-setting fits into a  larger framework of project  and
program evaluation, i.e.,  of performance measurement.  The final section offers such a framework.
My own view is that outcome, or impact, targets can often be useful as political and staff
motivators within countries and can provide one  important yardstick for measuring performance.
They  should therefore  be  used  wherever  the  local  political and  cultural  climates  make  them
acceptable.  But  I put much more emphasis  on monitoring trends than  on  setting and  meeting
targets.The  "bottom line"  is really  a  simple one:  is  the proportion of couples using  effective
contraception rising?  If this  is happening, it means that the net result of acceptor numbers,  the
methods they are using,  and continuation rates is moving in the right direction (not all components
of this  trio  may  be rising,  and we should  know what  is happening  to each  of them  . . . .).  A rising
and robust CPR (one that reflects "modern" contraception) inevitably means falling fertility.  One
might argue, therefore, that the CPR is "all we really need to know."  While demographers may be
able to  work  out demographic trends  from the  CPR  (by age groups),  we  always want direct,
independent data to cross-check our impressions.  So there will always be a need for separate CPR
and ASFR surveys (the separate sets of data may in fact be gathered in a single survey-see  the
Recommendations section for the need to increase staff knowledge, both in the Bank and in host
governments, about conducting surveys.  Note esp. fn.  1I).  I neglect the use of births recorded in
vital statistics systems because of an impression, perhaps wrong, that these are almost invariably
weak and unreliable.
VI.  Bank Instruments Used for Evaluating Its Projects
The Bank has long given considerable attention to monitoring and evaluating its lending
operations.  As noted, current guidance to  staff on  these questions is  contained in  Operational
Directive 10.70; this distinguishes between "monitoring" and "evaluation," defines Bank policy and
the  roles of PCRs and  PPARs, and  discusses the need for including in  projects a  management
information system that will generate "a minimum core of quantitative and qualitative indicators for
monitoring progress towards [quantified project objectives]."  But the guidelines wisely note that,
"There can be no standard list of indicators, even within an individual sector . . ."  Such humility
throws the ball into PHN's court to define its indicators as it thinks best.  Most of these are "second
nature" to experienced staff working in population (see above, para.  12).  But, as noted earlier,
evaluation of project performance concerns more than using a set of standard sector indicators.
It is useful to remind ourselves of the large number of instruments the Bank uses to tell
us how weUl  a project is doing or has done.  Some clearly have different primary objectives.  Not
all are available for all projects.  Most become available at different  times in a project's history.  But
presumably all do have, or should have, something to teU  us about a project's performance.  Here's
the list:
Supervision Reports
Internal  bank  progress-reports,  focused  on  how  well  project  implementation and
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same subjects,  which the borrower Is required to submit  to the Bank.  Supervision  reports rarely
report on program  performance,'  being  preoccupied  with project implementation.
Mid-Term Project Reviews
A fairly high proportion  of projects  provide  for these, and have done so since  the first
one in 1970.  Where a project is large in relation  to a country's  total program, the reviews will
examine  the program's performance,  not just that of the project alone.  The early reviews were
usually  done by outside  experts. More recent  reviews  (and  there are several)  are often  internal,  done
by the borrower's own staff.  Both types are intended  to result in written  reports copies of which
would come to the Bank.  However, I have not seen more than one such review and have no
judgment  on how useful they are as a monitoring  device  that leads to program/project  adjustment.
Would it be useful to have a YP or Research Assistant  review such Reviews  to see if they are
anything  more than a bureaucratic  nuisance  that makes  Bank project designers  feel virtuous when
they mandate  them? A different  kind of external  review  is the Bangladesh  model: the program's
several donors meet annually  with program  administrators  to review  recent progress  and agree on
a work plan  for the next  year. The  government  is provided  a list of indicators  to be used in briefing
those who attend the meeting.  The incentive influence  of  this annual, in-person reporting
requirement  may be as useful to the system as the existence  of acceptor  targets. The purpose (said
to be well realized) is to provide a forum for dialogue  that can help identify needed mid-term
adjustments. The approach  is, of course, additive  to the simple  existence  of targets  and is intended
to help reach (or revise)  them.
Operatonal  Research Studies
A fair number  of projects have components  that aim at creating increased  borrower
capaity for conducting  such studies. Needed  individual  studies  are almost  never listed, however.
I doubt anyone knows  which country  programs may have received  useful information  from these
components-it is probably  enough  just to provide  generic  support  for capacity-building  and hope  for
the best. A different  but related  route  to program  evaluation  and "fine  tuning"  is to mandate  that in-
country staff themselves  develop  objective  indicators  for their activities  and meet periodically  to
assess how well they are doing (cf.the two Zimbabwe  projects, esp. the second).
Repeate  Projects
These are one of the richest sources  of program  and earlier-project  performance  data.
Each successive  SAR invariably  contains  information  about program  progress.  They give higb
visibility  to such  progress  to Bank  staff  and to the Board. If Iwere looking  for progress  reports  on
program  performance  in a country  with more  than one Bank  project, I would  turn first to successive
SARs.
'Operational  Directive  13.05  instru  staff  to attach  to Supervision  reports  an aex  (nornally  not longer  than one
page)  that displqs "in tabular  form...quantitative  measures  of projet performance  in critical  areas, such  u  constructios
progress,  yields, adoption  rates, enroUments,  target  groups  reached,  trafflc,  operating  efflciency,  and financo. The
indicators  should  be solected  on the basis  of the SAR  and agreed  with  the SOD/COD  chief  concerned.'  I have  not
reviewed  any supervision  reports  to spa bow  often  this is done.Bank snwncre usedfor evaluadng  is projects  1
Project Completion  Reports (PCRs)
These  report  primarily  on project  implementation,  not its subsequent  performance.  They
are  concerned with  essentially the  same data  that  supervision reports  deal  with  during
implementation.  Written  by the  Department  responsible  for project  supervision,  PCRs  can  be written
only after projects  are complete  and typically  appear  a year or so after the final disbursement  has
been made.  As yet only 31 of the 75 projects  covered  by this review  have been completed  long
enough to have their PCRs written. They are not an important  source of information  on project
performance  after completion.
Project Performance Audit Reports (PPARs)
While every completed  project gets a PCR, PPARs are done on only a  sample of
projects. Seventeen  Population  PPARs  had been  written  as of October,  1991. Their purpose  differs
entirely from the PCR: the latter addresses  implementation,  the PARs  address  what happens  after
implementation  is complete. They  are meant  to be evaluative  and  judgmental  and to throw  up lessons
that will lead to better projects in the future.  They are written not by those who designed  or
supervised  the project but by neutral,  uninvolved  outsiders,  responsible  to OED. A PPAR is begun
about when a PCR has been completed,  i.e., roughly two years after implementation. So the
operational  period brought  under review  is relatively  short. It can, however,  answer the question,
"Is the project off to a good start or a bad one, and why?" To the extent that project components
began  functioning  before  final  completion,  the PPAR  may  be able to offer  useful comments  on early
project performance. A review of the 17 PPARs  shows  that where targets were included  in the
SARs,  the PPARs  reported  on performance  against  them but were usually  silent on targeting  when
no targets had been set.  The PPAR  for the first Malaysia  project, however, specifically  criticized
The  project for having  failed to specify  indicators.
Non-iBank  External Reviews
PARs  are not the only type  of independent  performance  reviews  employed  by OED,  nor
has OED been the only sponsor of external reviews.  Within the past few years,  OED has
commissioned  eight such reviews  of Bank lending  to eight different  countries  (Bangladesh,  Brazil,
Colombia,  India,  Indonesia,  Kenya,  Mexico,  and Senegal)  and has prepared  a useful  summary  of the
findings  (see below,  pam. 29 ff.).  In 1985  the old PHN Department  (i.e., the operating  department
before  the Bank  reorganization  of 1987)  commissioned  a review  of the Bank's  population  lending  and
sector work by a  two-man  team from the Univ. of Michigan (the late George Simmons and
Rushikesh  Man)'.  Relevant  parts of both those reports are summarized  in the following  section.
VII.  Three Perspectives  from Outside  Bank Operations
It will be helpful  to review  what others  have  said about  the role 9f targets in  judging FP
project  and program  performance. There is of course a large literature  on evaluation. I have made
no attempt to review that literature.  For our interest (i.e., judging the Bank's approach to
performance  evaluation,  with special  reference  to the use of targets)  it is sufficient  to summarize  (i)
Published  us  blue-caver  Wodking  Pper (WPS 94) onder  the  tite, The  World  Bank's  Populations Lending and
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the two reports cited in para. 25 (vii)  that deal specifically  with Bank  practice  and (ii) a forthcoming
major  research  study,  funded  by USAII, that will  try to bring more  order into  a somewhat  confiused
and contentious  field.
The 1985 Report by Simmons  and Maru
Simmons  and Maru are not very helpful on how they think performance-monitoring
should  be handled. On the  one hand, they  complain  that supervision  missions  pay too much  attention
to humdrum  questions  of project implementation  and tend to neglect  "measures  of program  activity
such as the quantity and quality of transactions or of intermediate  output measures such as
prevalence' (p.40). If they reaUy  mean  to load  such reporting  on supervision  missions,  I can only
disagree. They  themselves  note (p.60)  that "Supervision  missions  provide  neither the time nor the
incentives  for the mission  leader to give adequate  attention  to process  evaluation."  But if time and
incentives  were provided, how useful is it to worry too much about "process"  events while the
project is still being built? Nor do I understand  their proposals for measuring  the "quality of
transactions in a project  or program-a concept  they  seem  to favor  but nowhere  define. 9 They  note
that "The  problem of evaluation  is compounded  due to weak project designs, which do not detail
evaluation  procedures  and measures";  this reflects,  they say, "lack  of evaluation  design and targets
at the project formulation  stage"  (p.61). They apparently  felt that the Bank could  do more  with the
use of targets.  At the end of the day, however,  they say that 'it  may never be able to evaluate
[projecti  effects  adequately  . . . because  of the complexity  of projects  and the environment  in which
they are implemented'  (p.74).
Their final advice  to the Bank  is that it "adopt  a systems  approach  to the evaluation  of
projects  and that evaluation  be undertaken  on a more  regular  basis  to avoid  the delays  that have  been
experienced  in the past" (p.74,  para. 7). They  do not say what they mean  by "a systems  approach."
If they mean that repeater-project  preparation  and appraisal  missions,  or OED internal  or external
evaluators,  should  collect  all the quantitative  and qualitative  performance  information  they can find
and come up with a holistic  judgment  on how well a project (or program)  has performed,  I would
agree. Performance  against  targets  would  provide  one useful  input  to such  an overall  judgment. But
one does not come away from Simmons  and Maru with very clear ideas on how evaluations  ought
to be made and what role targets  should  play in making  them.
Ihe  1991  OED Report
As noted, OED has recently  completed  a review of Bank population  work in eight
countries. ITe  case studies  were done by outside  experts  and aU  were  then summarized,  and lessons
drawn, by OED (Popidadon  and the World  Bank. A Review  of Activies and Impacts  from Eight
Case Sndis,  October 1991, Report No. 10021, 92 pp.).  Among  the major conclusions  of the
review  are the following:
7D  its propoaal  to USAID  for the EFPPI  project  (sea bdow), the winning  contraor  has some  suggestive  commenu
about  how  the "quality  of cre,'  or srvice, might  be assessed.  It suggets six dements:  choice  of methods,  client
co uning,  sff  comptence, interpeonal rdations,  folow-up,  and srvice acceptability.  It goes  on to sugget how  these
quality-elemens  might  be evluated. See also  p. 27 Rf.  bdow.three  perapecdves  foom osde  bank operations  17
Bank staff and Bank projects  have been  too oriented  to the supply side of population
work and have  paid insufficient  attention  to the processes  of social  and economic  change  underlying
the demand  for family  planning. If staff had searched  more diligently  for "selective  interventions
into the development  process that [havel the possibility  of changing  implicit benefits  and costs of
large families-far more  might  have been  accomplished"  (p. xi).  It is not enough,  the report  feels,
to rely on the Bank's  general  program  of development  lending  to produce  the kinds  of changes  that
generate  a desire for smaller families. The assertion  is made  that had the Bank searched  for non-
population  projects  and components  that lead  to smaller  families,  it could have identified  them and
results  would  have  been stronger  (parn. 8.05). On the lending  side, therefore,  the main  conclusion
is that the scope  of population  activities  should  have  been broader.
As for "monitoring  and evaluation,"  the report notes that some such component  "is
required in all projects"" 0 but few have one, and the subject is  "generally neglected during
supervision." A frustrating  aspect  of the eight-country  review  has been "our inability  to determine
more clearly whether  population  projects are having the desired impact or not.  It is precisely
because  of the neglect  of monitoring,  evaluation  and research  components  in these  projects  that  this
is the case" (8.25).  The report then suggests  that "without  baseline  and control group data . . .
proper assessment  is impossible."
Part of the  problem  in getting  usefil evaluation  work  done  is that local  capacity  for doing
such work  is absent  or weak. While  there has been "a large volume  of so-called  operations  research,
its quality is often dubious." The conclusion  is drawn  that if the Bank and other donors had paid
more attention  to building  such capacity,  the quality  of research  output  would  have been better.
Within  the Bank,  demand  for strong  monitoring,  evaluation,  and research  activity  is said
to be weak. The Board  should  require "evaluations  of past efforts  ...  to explain  and justify  projects
proposed  to it. It would  also help  if senior  management  were to make  it clear  that a proposed  project
has not been properly  designed-and therefore  is not ready for Board  presentation-until  it includes
a convincing  plan for establishing  a monitoring  and evaluation  capacity  and then for utilizing  that
capacity  to answer  questions  about  the project" (8.29).
At the end, however, the report's evaluation  focus shifts from the level of project
performance  to progress  in achieving  sector  goals.  "In evaluating  population  projects, more  weight
should  be given  to proximate  output  measures,  focusing  on those believed  to be the most important
for achieving  sector goals" (8.55).  There is no indication  of what "proximate  output measures"
should be used or how such sector-level  indicators are to be used alongside the project-level
monitoring  and evaluation  indicators  referred  to earlier. Indeed,  the report  complains,  near its end,
that too often evaluation  focuses "on  projects  rather than non-project  activities,  to ask whether  the
project did what the SAR ...  said it would  do, and within  projects  to focus on the more  expensive
and quantifiable  inputs.  While this is important  for accountability  purposes, it leads  to an excess
focus  on projects,  on inputs rather  than outputs,  and more  important,  on the specific  inputs  included
in the project rather than on whatever  is needed  to advance  the goals of the sector" (8.54).
While some  of the OED  comments  are not as explicit,  transparent,  and actionable  as one
might  wish, I agree with the final  comment  that monitoring  program (=sector) output  performance
"Seo  pam. 4 of Operational  Directive  10.70: 'Plas  for monitoring  and evaluation  are to be included  in all Bank-
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should  hold a higher  priority  than  project monitoring.  The latter  is not irrelevant,  just less relevant,
in many cases,
Major Forthcoming Study Sponsored By USAIE)
In the faU  of 1991,  USAID  awarded  a multi-milion  dollar, five-year  evaluation  contract
to three well-known  U.S. popuiation  groups,  led by the Carolina  Population  Center  at the University
of North Carolina.  The effort, known  as the "Evaluating  Family  Planning  Program Impact," or
EFPPI, project, aims  to develop  a methodology  for assessing  the impact  of USAID'S  generation-old,
world-wide  population  programs. The project  is the most ambitious  such effort  ever  undertaken  and
will be of great interest to aUl  agencies  active in the field.  The main outputs of the project are
expected  to be available  (in draft, at least)  by the end of 1993.
It is a commentary  on the unsettled  state  of evaluation  methodology  that USAID  has felt
the need for such help. The winning  bidder's 64 single-space  pp. proposal  (copy  on file with Mr.
Bulatao  in PHN)  itself provides  a useful sketch  of the present  state  of the art and lists six documents
which it expects  to have ready, in draft, within  two years (a state-of-the  art review of evaluation
methodology;  a conceptual  framework  paper; a topology  of family  planning  programs;  an evaluation
manual for practitioners;  a handbook  of consistent  indicators, with standardized  definitions;  and
interactive  software that can be used for computerizing  the results of Demographic  and Health
Surveys  (DHS). In addition,  the project  will include  a series of country  and methodological  studies
that will presumably  apply and test the recommended  methodologies.
While the EFPPI  project  will remove  the need  for any major, formal  work  on evaluation
by others for the next few years, it should not stop the Bank from trying to improve its own
performance  indicators  without  waiting  for results from the EFPPI project. The recommendations
of this review  are made in that spirit.
VIII.  Conclusions  and Recommendations
A Word Of Caution
This review  was commissioned  because  there  is apparently  some  uneasiness  among  Bank
managers  that not enough  attention  has been paid to target-setting,  and to the evaluation  of project
impacts, in the Bank's population  lending.  My reading  of the evidence  does not lead me to this
view. One  of my principal  conclusions  would  be that the better  one understands  the nature  of targets
and indicators,  and their applicability  to different  levels and stages of population  work, the higher
the marks one gives the Bank on how it has used them. There is always  room for improvement,
however;  the six recommendations  at the end may  help achieve  it.
There are two core  evaluation  questions  Bank  managers  and staff  are typically  interested
in when looking  at population  operations:
>  How well is a country's  program  doing?  (present  tense)
*  How well did a particular  Bank  project do? (past tense)
One of the difficulties  in dealing  with targets  and indicators  is that  people are not always  clear which
question  they are asking,  or they assume  that measurements  applicable  at one level must be equalyConciwionw  and  recommendatiom  19
useable  at the other. Unfortunately,  this is not so. As we will see when we look at a simple  model
later on, targets and indicators  are very useful  when looking  at the input  end of project  activity;  but
when  attention  tumus  to "impacts"  and "outcomes,"  the  most useful  indicators  are  program  indicators.
Perhaps  the most  controversial  point  I want to make,  especially  for non-population,  non-
project  staff, concerns  how  the Bank  can  best learn  from its project  experience  so it can design  better
projects. Some  people  apparently  feel that more  and better targets  and indicators,  built into project
design  at the start, are needed  to support  such  evaluations,  especially  the evaluation  of major  project
components  or  activities.  Population  projects are complex enough without overloading  their
managements  and information  systems  with requirements for data which, even if successfully
collected,  are unlikely  to make  much difference  to the design  of future  projects, either in the same
or other countries.  "Strategic  thinking"  inspired by imagination  and based on a knowledge  of
international  population  programs, and on a country's own situation  and on the activities  of other
donors,  is decisive  for project  design. What  is to be encouraged  for better evaluation  work  are well-
focused operational  research studies on specific  topics, and general program reviews, not the
multiplication  of targets  and indicators  which may or may  not someday  be used.
Past Use Of Targets and Indicators
Project should  be evaluated  in terms of their objectives. Not all population  projects,
however, make it a stated objective  to increase PP acceptors  and the CPR, and  reduce fertility.
Those may be long-term  Bank goals for a country,  and increasingly  shared  by most governments.
But a long-term  goal for a country  is not the same  thing  as a five-year  goal for a project. As noted,
a project, particularly  a first project, may simply aim at basic system- and institution-building:
getting  a Primary  Health Care  network  built and staffed,  organizing  an MCH program,  introducing
PP services  for the first time, or helping  establish  a population  policy  and program.  Beginning  in the
early eighties it became  a requirement  that all SARs should include an explicit  statement  of the
project's objectives. These  SAR paragraphs  are usually  informative,  fiee of "boilerplate,' and are
one of the likely  sources  of information  about  targets  if targets  are included. It would  be a mistake
to mandate that quantitative  output or outcome targets (e.g., acceptor or  CPR levels, fertility
reductions)  be included  among  the "statement  of objectives' in all projects. Sometimes  targets  are
appropriate,  sometimes  they are not (never  when  governments  don't want them).
Ite  Annex  II SAR summaries  show great interest in targets, beginning  with the very
first project and continuing  down to the present.  The fact that about one-third of all country
operations  have  not used  targets  does not reflect  neglect  and weakness  of project  design  but realism,
pragmatism,  and a respect  for Government  wishes. So, by and large, I think the Bank  has done a
good, professional  job when  it has used quantitative  targets, and has not been sloppy  or negligert
when it has not used them.
More  often  than  not, the Bank  has analyzed  and commented  on government-set  program
targets, sometimes  urging higher ones, sometimes  lower and more realistic  ones.  In two or three
cases  the Bank  has recommended  that programs  without  targets  establish  them. Generally  speWing,
the Bank is certainly 'pro-target."  Staff know targets spice up the game and provide a way of
keeping  score. They  may  also realize  that targets  provide  an arena for dialogue,  both in their setting
and during subsequent  monitoring.  However,  playing the critic to government  program targes
serves a different  function  than setting  targets at the level of Bank  projects: the latter may or may
not be sufficiently  independent  of national  program  activities  to make  project targets  feasible. Even
where feasible  they may not be desirable,  since  they can distort  programs  and record-keeping.20  Targets  and Indicators  in Bank Popuadkon  Projects
Tho Iind  of targets just discussed  are normally "intermediate  output targets"-i.e.,
acceptor and CPR targets, although they may sometimes include "final outcome' demographic
targets; any others are much  less  important  (for  types of indicators  and targets, see below,  pan. 46).
When  we move  from the level  of national  program  to that of the Bank  project,  we move
into a different  ball-game. It is the level at which Bank accountability  for the use of Bank funds  is
important  (providing  a major reason  for the Bank's traditional  emphasis  on project supervision). It
Is also the level at which Bank Management  seeks to draw lessons  for the effectiveness  of Bank
operations,  an interest  institutionalized  in the work  of the Operations  Evaluation  Department  (OED)
and the preparation  of Project Completion  Reports  (PCRs)  and Project  Performance  Audit Reports
(PPARs).
Annex  m summarizes  the findings  of the 17 PPARs  that have  been completed  to date.
A recurrent theme in the OED audits is that Bank population  projects have not developed a
sufficiently  clear hierarchy of objectives,  indicators, and targets that can be used for program,
project, impact, and process measurements.  OED has not attempted  to provide  such a hierarchy,
however;  it has simply  urged PHN to do so.  Although  not undertaken  for that purpose, this paper
counts as a step in that direction.
My generaly supportive  evaluation  of how  Bank  operational  staff  have  used targets  and
indicators  does not leave Bank  practice  with a perfect  score, however. The main  problems  I detect
are the following:
*.  Bank  managers  may  entertain  more ambitious  roles for targets, esp. at the project  level,
than the Bank's population  professionals,  few of whom believe outcome targets are
usef  at either project or program  level.
:.  There may not yet be  enough consensus  on the differences  between targets and
indicators, and not enough understanding  that targets are not the only comparators
available  for judging  performance. All targets require  indicators  but not all indicators
require  targets.
. Indicator  terminology  is not standardized,  and while  confusion  is not great, it would  be
helpful, and not difficult, to achieve greater consistency  in how different types of
indicators  are labeled.
*.  I suspect that only a handfil of the Bank's non-population  staff have an adequate
understanding  of the three key indicators  and their construction  (i.e., "acceptors,"  the
Contacepdve  Prevalence  Rate, and the Total  Fertility  Rate). In particular,  I see a need
to give greater attention  to the problem of "contraceptive  mix," a key aspect of a
program's  ultimate  effectiveness,  i.e., its demographic  impact.
*  Fnally, Bank  staff  need  to recognize  the new  concern  for the quality  of PP services  and
should help develop better indicators for measuring  this dimension  of projects and
programs (see paras. 50-54).
Further comments  and suggestions  on these  points will be found in the paragraphs  that follow. The
whole discussion  will become  clearer,  however, after we walk through  a simple  model.ConcwLions  and  recomnmendawions  21
A Simple Model Suggests  Four Sets of Indicators
I find it helpful  to use a simple  model  of what a FP program  is and what we want it to
accomplish. The model is shown in Figure 1. On the left we have the FP program, or delivery
system,  showing  some of its main components.  The program  is split into two main  parts (elements
concerned  with the delivery  of FP services,  and elements  concerned  with stimulating  demand). The
system (=the  FP program and its physical, human, and financial  resources)  represents  a static
potential  that has no significance  independent  of its functioning. But to function,  it must first be
built-not  usually all at once, but over many  years, the result of many projects.  "Systems"  and
"programs"  are never  finished  and complete. New activities  and projects  are always  c vming  along
to enlarge or modify  existing  systems.
The design  of the system,  or increments  to it, and bringing  them into existence  belong
to project design and implementation.  Project supervision  is the monitoring  of implementation,  a
process that involves  an intense period of physical  and financial  reporting  to measure progress
towards  project  completion. As project components  reach completion  they  are ready  to function,  to
begin  the repetitive  activities  that contribute  to the purposes  for which the system  was built.
The "activation"  or functioning  of the system  produces  a stream  of input  activities  whose
sum constitutes  a process intended to recruit FP acceptors, reduce unwanted  births, and lower
fertility.  It is desirable to know the activity levels (and, if feasible, the quality levels) of key
activities  during system operation  (an ongoing,  long-term  process). To the extent we can invent
indicators of such activity, we have a set of "process indicators." But looking at the process
indicators  telis us nothing  about what effect  they are having.  We want to know how the system  is
performing  in terms of recruiting  and retaining  acceptors. So we develop  a set of "performance
indicators"  that measure  output performance,  or "yield." Performance  indicators  suggest what is
probably  happening  to the ultimate  outcomes  or effects  we are hoping  for, but they cannot  give us
conclusive  information. The results they measure  are intermediate  between  system  input activities
and the desired  final  outcomes  (i.e., lower  fertility  and slower  growth  in population). To see if we
are achieving those final outcomes  we need yet another  set of indicators  which will quantify,  and
either confirm  or revise, the inferences  we draw when  we look at the intermediate  output  indicators.
All this is simple  and straightforward  and should  be clear from Fig. 1. We now  see that
we have four sets of indicators,  two of which measure  system  inputs, two outputs or results:
inputs
*  Project  implementation  indicators;
P.  Proces, or activity, indicators, which  measure
recurrent,  post-implementation  activities.
Outputs
Performance which  measure  the intermediate  outputs,  or non-demographic  results, of
system  functioning. OccasionaUly,  in  Bank  documents,  these  indicators  are referred  to
as "proximate variables" (unhappy, as it conflicts  with demographers' use of that
phrase);Fgure  1.  SCHEMATIC  MODEL  OF  A FAMILY  PLANNING  PROGRAM  AND  INDICATORS  OF  ITS  PERFORMANCE'
(Sequenial flow.  read from  left  to right)
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Demographic  outcome indicators,  which measure  the degree of success in realizing
ultimate  objectives. These are sometimes  called "impact  indicators"  since  they
usually  refer to ultimate  demographic  results  beyond  which no questions  are asked.
The position  of these  indicators should  be clear from a careful  reading  of Fig. 1. They
cover a sequence  of activities  in which the output of one stage  becomes  an input of the following
stage-or in which good  performance  shown  by a lower-stage  (left-band)  indicator  is a precondition
for good performance  at a higher-stage  (right-hand)  indicator. Notice  also that different  individual
indicators,  and classes  of indicators,  have  different  frequencies,  and involve  quite different  costs for
constructing  and maintaining  them. The final-  outcome  indicators  have  the lowest frequency-it is
costly, and a considerable  administrative  effort, to conduct surveys and censuses.  Within the
performance  indicators, CPR figures, (or continuation  and dropout rates, both of which require
surveys),  are constructed  much less frequently  than acceptor  data, which are produced  weekly  or
monthly  by a system's  routine  service  statistics. The routine,  lower-cost,  frequently-issued  indicators
are often  taken  as proxies  for what  is happening  at the 'ultimate  outcome"  stage;  however,  their often
low quality,  and limited  detail  (e.g. acceptor  figures  may  not show  distribution  among  methods)  may
mislead  inexperienced  readers. Thus  it is very important  to construct  outcome  indicators  periodically
to see what is really happening. Today,  DHS surveys  are the standard  way of doing this.1'
The above  terminology,  and the stages  to which  they are tied, are not used consistently
in Bank documents. One encounters  use of "performance,"  "process," "output," Woutcome,"  and
'impact" indicators  but they are almost  never  defined,  are not always  clear, not always logical,  and
not always  consistent. If the Bank could standardize  terminology  along the lines of para. 46, it
would  be consistent  with usage in most of the leading  population  institutions.
At Project Level, Emphasize Activity Indicators, Not Outcomes
The issue  of improving  indicators  is far more  complex  and important  than wondering  if
the Bank  makes  sufficient  use of targets. As noted,  indicators  without  some  ldnd of comparators  are
meaningless.  Only three types of comparators  are possible:  targets, past performance,  and the
performance  of other systems (usually  other countries).  While tugets  can play a  useful role
(particularly  at national  or program  level), most population  specialists  strongly  prefer trends and
"The DHS  (Demographic  and Headth  Surveys)  program  of sample  surveys  has boen developed  in recent  yeas by
IRD/Macro  Iternational of Columibia,  Maryland. The  phrase  *DHS  swuveys'  has, In fact, become  aImoot  a proprietr
term for  the vwvo  in which  IRD/Mao  Int'1  is now  pro-emiaent.  In addkion  to its techoical  quality,  the DHS  program  is
given  high marks  for the  peed  with  which it compiles  and releas  survey  results.
Today's  DHS  survoys  are the direct  descendants  of two  similar  programs  conducted  dudag the 1970s  and early
1980's,  the World  Fetility Surveys  (WFS)  and the Contraceptive  Prwealnce  Surveys  (CPS),  both ponsored  by the
Intrnational  Statiial  ntiute  in The  Hague. The  WFS  were funded  jointly  by USAID  and UNFPA,  the CPS  by
USAID  alone. Today's  DHS  surveys  havo  so  far been  fundod  entirely  by USAID  (an  initial  Bank-fundod  DHS,  in
Namibia,  is expected  to be authorized  soon). DHS  surveys  have  been  conducted  in some  35 countrie, with another  20 or
so  cheduled  for coverage  within  the neot  year or two. Repeater  surveys  (ideally  very three to five  yea)  will  be done
in 10-12  countries,  bringing  the total number  of DHS  to over  50.  The  typical  Individual  survey  inolves local  costs  of
U.S. S250400,000  (the additonal  cost for IRD's  technical  assistance  has so far ben  covered  under  a multi-year  USAID
contract). Before  the Dank  can make  greatr use of the DHS  resource,  (i) more  stff  must  become  ate  of its existenoe,
and (ii) borow  must  be willing  to include  the costs  of such surveys  in BDak  project if grmat  funds  are not available.24  Targets  and Indicators  in Ban* Populaion Projects
international comparisons for measuring  performance,  not success in meeting  targets.' 2 PHN
could perform  a useful service  by assembling  tables and (especially)  graphs  that provide  Bank staff
with convenient comparators-the levels attained by representative  countries on  key PP and
demographic  indicators  and the rate at which  progress  has been  achieved. One  summer  intern  should
be enough to get such a data-bank  established.
The reservations  expressed  about  most project-level  output  indicators do not apply at
the input and activity  levels,  however. Simple  service  statistics  should  of course  be produced  (they
typically  contain  a mixture  of activity and performance indicators). The entire process  of project
implementation,  for example,  is one of performance  against  targets-getting facilities  built, equipped,
staffed, and put into service; procuring  vehicles;  procuring  supplies; trining  staff; etc.  Every
'project dscription'  in an SAR  is a list  of targets, full  of quantitative  indicators;  project  supervision
is a detailed  monitoring  of progress  in meeting  those  targets. The Bank  is widely  credited  with doing
an excellent  job at the 'supervision"  stage,  assuring  that funds  are spent  for their intended  purposes.
The game becomes  more difficult  when we move  to the next stage-establishing  targets or other
Indicators  for the activities  made  possible  by successful  project  implementation  (see pars. B at bottom
left of Fig. 1).  More attention  deserves  to be given  to incorporating  indicators  of program (in¢l.
project)  activities  into  the program's  normal  MIS. Types  of activity  or process  indicators  that should
be considered  for collection  are illusaed  below:
- no. of active  service-points,  by type
. vacancies,  by category,  at service-points  ("fill ratio")
P.  no. of daily/weekly  visitors by type of service-point
P  no. of home visits made by home  visitors
*.  training and retaining courses  held and numbers  attending
*  contrweptive  supplies  distributed,  by type and by service-points
a  IEC activities  (radio/TV  spots; films  produced  and no. of showings;  schools  using pop.
ed. materials).
Most  of these  indicators  should  be generated  by a program's  normal  service-statistics  or MIS system.
Again, they should  normally  be reported  at program,  not project level (it should  not be difficult  to
do special analyses  at the project level if there is reason for such; but routine reporting  of such
figures  for project facilities  alone only generates  too much  unused  paper).
A New And Difficult  DimensIon: Tihe  Quality Of Service
There is one subtle  but important  recent development  in PP programs  that deserves  to
go on the agenda for "improved  indicators."  I refer to the increased concern for measuring  the
quality of services being offered.  Its measurement  involves a mixtre  of input and outcome
indicators.
USone,  experienced  project  staff  woan  agpinst  the temptation  for  Bank  population  expets to push  their *good
performance'  projctions on govemment  ofcia.  as 'target.  It is inheoent  in the work  of senior  government  officiaJl
that  they often  get caught  up in political  considerations  lilcely  to affeat  program  desig and implementation  - including  the
satting  of tragets. Bank  staff  must  be  aseitive  to such considerations  and remain  flexible  in deciding  when  it may  be
useul, and when  dangeous, to esablish program  or project  output  tges.  Trends  and international  comparisons  provide
comparators  that avoid  political  sensitivity.Conclauton  and  recomaendations  25
Concern for  service quality reflects the broadening of  FP objectives beyond the
demographic  goal of slowing  population  growth which has dominated  programs for nearly three
decades. That 'top down,"  supply-driven  goal has not become  invalid  and obsolete. It is, however,
being  supplemented  by increased  concern  for giving  clients  (mostly  women)  more  information  about
their options, for widening  the number  of options  being  offered,  for educating  rather than "selling"
them, for worrying  about  their reproductive  health and sexuality  as well as about  their fertility,  and
for treating  clients  so that  they  become  satisfied,  healthy,  continuing  contraceptors.  As one advocate
of the shift has expressed  it, programs are moving  from demographic  objectives  with individual
benefits  to the provision  of individual  benefits  with demographic  impacts.  Such an emphasis  is
demand-  or client-driven;  it is in fact the orientation  that private PP providers  have had for many
years.
The top down  (demographic)  and bottom-up  (client-service)  goals need  not be opposed
to each other, although  it takes  a special  effort  to serve both effectively. The keys are (a) the tone
of program leadership  and (b) the quality of staff training. With this summary,  what can we say
about indicators  that might  measure  the quality  of project or program  services?
The PHN Board paper (Sprng, 1992)  devoted  nearly  eight pages to service  quality  as
an element  in program  effectiveness.  The paper  identifies  the following  factors  as key elements  in
service quality: access  to services,  the variety  of methods  offered,  continuation  of use, sensitive
counseling  and informed  choice,  and staff  technical  competence. Some  of these components  can be
measured,  as a first-approximation,  with check-lists:  e.g., what methods  are offered  at which tpes
of facilities? Which categories  of staff are permitted to provide which kinds of services? Do
training/retraining  courses  include  modules  on counseling  techniques?  Other aspects  might  require
sample  surveys-e.g. of client  waiting  times and travel distances;  of client  satisfaction  with services
received.
An important  indirect  indicator  of service  quality,  of course, is the dropout  rate (or its
obverse,  the continuation  rate), since low rates reflect  higher satisfaction  than high rates. Dropout-
rate studies are much rarer than CPR sample  surveys,  becuse they are more difficult  to do (data
need  to be colected over extended  time periods, for different  methods,  since  most clients  eventually
discontinue  use, or change methods,  for one reason or another, even in high-quality  programs).
Bank  projects  probably  ought  to push  harder  for more  dropout  studies, although  their feasibility  will
depend  in part on professional  and institutional  resources  available  in a country  or on program  use
of technical  assistance  (the  DHS  program,  for example,  includes  some  dropout-rate  questions  as part
of its core DHS questionnaire).  The "bottom  line" with regard  to quality-of-service  indicators  seems
to be: it is a relatively  new field,  with progress  likely  to consist  of a combination  of one-time  check-
lists, sample  surveys  of client  satisfaction,  and increased  emphasis  on continuation-rate  studies.
Six  Recommendations
We close this review  b;  listing six specific  recommendations  for improving  how the
Bank uses targets and indicators  in its population  work.  They  are:
*  Staff should  standardize  terminology  by using the terms ilustrated in Fig. I and listed
in para. 46.
*  PHN should  prepare,  periodically,  a set of comparator  graphs  and tables  for use in Bank
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*  Operational  staff  should  show  stronger  concern  for a program's  contraceptive  mix, both
at the stage of project design and in measuring  program  performance.  iv.  Increased
attention  should  be devoted  to measuring  a program's service quality. This requires
sensitivity  to an important  recent development  in the field and a need to agree on and
use a set of appropriate  indicators  (see above,  paras. 53-54).
. The use of Demographic  and Health Surveys (DHS) should be the rule, not the
exception  in Bank  populatian  and health  projects. While  a U.S. firm  is now  pre-eminent
in this field,  the Bank should  work with it to help create additional  survey  capabilities,
both national  and international.
*  Serious  thought  should  be given  to discontinuing  PPARs  for population  projects. They
rarely add much to PCRs, and the resources  devoted  to them could  be better used in
funding internal  or external  operational  research studies,  and to external reviews  of
national  population  programs.
Most  of these  recommendations  concern  clarification  of Bank  thinking  and terminology,
irst among  professionals  engaged  in population  work,  then  among  managers  whose  job it is to worry
about  the effectiveness  of Bank  assistance. We  can achieve  these  modest  objectives  by holding  a few
staff seminars  and circulating  a paper or two.  The hoped-for  consensus  may point to a need for
wider use of certain  indicators,  involving  some additional  project record-keeping,  costs, and staff.
But instead  of pressing  for a maximum  set of refined  but  probably  never-used  indicators,  the pressure
should all go in the opposite  direction-seeing how little one can settle for.  Periodic evaluation
reviews  by  joint Bank/borrower  teams  or by external  review  missions,  or ad hoc operational  research
studies, can alone  provide  the rounded  judgments  on which  ec post project-design  assessments  must
rest.  Such  evaluations  will of course  need  to assemble  whatever  quantitative  me&a-ures  they  can find;
but serviceable  proxies  can almost  always  be found without  having  to burden a  vaoject  or program
with "indicatoritis,"  a disease  for which there is no good vaccination  except restraint.
Annex I.  PHN Projects with Major Population Objectives (1979-91)
Country  Project Name  SAR  Ln/Cr Amount
Date  (million  US $)
Bangladesh  1. Population  Project  2/3/75  15  Cr
2.  Second  Population  & Family  Health Project  5/16/79  32  Cr
3. Third Population  & Family  Health Project  12/24/85  78  Cr
4.  Fourth Population  & Health Project  5/20/91  130  Cr
Botswana  Family  Health  Project  11/11/84  11  Cr
Brazil  1. NE Basic  Health  Services  Project  4/30/86  59.5  Ln
2.  Second  NE Basic  Health  Services  Project  10/25/89  267  Ln
Burdina  Health  Services  Development  Project  5/20/85  26.6  Cr
Faso
Burundi  Population  & Health  Project  11/16/87  14  Cr
Colombia  Health Services  Integration  Project  6/18/85  36.5  LnAnnex L. PNVproje&ts  with major  populadon objeievs  27
Comoros  Health & Population Project  6/22/83  2.85  Cr
Dominican  Population & Family Health Project  8/31/76  5  Ln
Rep.
Egypt  1. Population Project  9/28/73  5  Cr
2.  Second Population Project  8/14/78  25  Cr
Ethiopia  Family Health Project  5/12/88  33  Cr
Ghana  1.  Health & Education Rehabilitation Project  12/24/85  15  Cr
2.  Second Health & Population Project  11/16/90  27  Cr
Guinea-  Population, Health & Nutrition Project  3/27/87  4.2  Cr
Bissau
Haiti  First Health Project  11/28/89  28.2  Cr
India  1. Population Project  5/15/72  21.2  Cr
2.  Second Population Project  1/15/80  46  Cr
3.  Third Population Project  11/9/83  70  Cr
4.  West Bengal-Fourth  Population Project  6/17/85  51  Cr
5.  Fifth (Bombay & Madras) Population Project  5/25/88  57  Cr
6.  (National Family Welfare & Systems  6/8/89  11.3  Ln
Development) Population Project  113.3  Cr
124.6
7.  Seventh Population Project  4/24/90  10  Ln
Au  Cr
96.7
Indonesia  1. Joint IDA-UNFPA Population Project  2/29/72  13.2  Cr
(+ 13.2 UNFPA)
2.  Second Population Project  5/31/77  24.5  Ln
3.  Third Population Project  5/19/80  35  Ln
4.  Fourth Population Project  4/10/85  46  Ln
5.  Fifth Population Project  2/8/91  104  Ln
Iran  Population Project  4/23/73  16.5  Ln
Ivory Coast  Health & Demographic Project  4/29/85  22.2  Ln
Jamaica  1.  Jamaica Population Project  6/2/70  2  Ln
2.  Second Population Project  5/26/76  6.8  Ln
3.  Population & Health Project  5/1/87  10  Ln
Jordan  Primary Health Care Project  4/11/85  13.5  Ln
Kenya  1. Population Project  2/20/74  12  Cr
2.  Integrated Rural Health & Family Planning  4/14/82  23  Cr
Project
3.  Third Population Project  4/20/88  12  Cr
4.  Fourth Population Project  3/9/90  35  Cr
Korea  Population Project  11/16/79  30  Ln28  Targets  and Indicators  In Bank Population  Projects
Lesotho  1.  Health & Population Project  4/1/85  3.5  Cr
2.  Second Population, Health, & Nutrition  6/10/89  12.1  Cr
Project
Madagascar  Economic Management & Social Action  10/27/88  22  Cr
Project
Malawi  1.  Health Project  3/24/83  6.8  Cr
2.  Second Family Health Project  2/26/87  11  Cr
3.  Population, Health, & Nutrition Sector  n.d.  55.5  Cr
Credit  (2/91?)
Malaysia  1.  Population Project  12/21/72  5  Ln
2.  Second Population & Family Health Project  6/16/78  17  Ln
Mali  1.  Health Development Project  11/15/83  16.7  Ln
2.  Second Health, Population, & Rural Water  2/22/91  26.6  Cr
Supply Project
Morocco  Health Development Ptoject  5/15/85  28.4  Ln
Niger  Health Project  2/26/86  27.8  Cr
Nigeria  1.  Sokoto Health Project  2/21/85  34  Ln
2.  Imo Health & Population Project  9/1/88  27.6  Ln
3.  National Population Project  4/21/91  78.5  Cr
Pakistan  Proposed Population Project  4/1/83  18  Cr
Pem  Primary Health Project  10/29/82  33.5  Cr
Philippines  1.  Population Project  5/22/74  25  Ln
2.  Second Population Ptoject  5/23/79  40  Cr
Rwanda  1.  Family Health Project  3/6/86  10.8  Cr
2.  First Poplation  Project  5/15/91  19.6  Cr
Senegal  1.  Rural Health Project  11/29/82  15  Cr
2.  Human Relations Development Project  3/12/91  35  Cr
Sierra  Health & Population Sector Support Project  4/22?/86  5.3  Cr
Leone
Sri Lanka  Health & Family Planning Project  3/25/88  17.5  Cr
Thailand  Population Project  1/18/78  33.1  Ln
Togo  Population & Health Sector Adjustment  1/23/91  14.2  Cr
Program
Trinidad &  Population Project  4/28/71  3  Ln
Tobago
Tunisia  1.  Population Project  3/3/71  4.8  Cr
2.  Population & Family Health Project  2/19/91  26  LnAnnA" L PHNprojects  wWs major  popAdan  objecdves  29
Yemen  Health Sector  Development  Project  5/7/90  15  Cr
Arab Rep.
Zimbabwe  1. Family  Health Project  6/20/86  10  Ln
2. Second  Family  Health  Project  4/30/91  25  Ln
Annex II.  Synopses of "Targeting" in Past Reports (1970-91)
Bangladesh (1975-91)
Four successive  five-year projects in  a  country with an  alarming P problem, a
government  with a long-standing  commitment  to ZPO, a high consensus  on P goals, and a strong
sense of urgency  among  government  and donors.
Pop I ('75): By far the most explicit  and comprehensive  targeting/evaluation  coverage
of the 75 SARs. Four  detailed  annexes,  totalling  47 pages, describe  base-line  and progress  indicators
and their generation. Indicators,  however,  are to be used to measure  how much  progress  is being
made towards long-term  program goals and not as operational  targets for the project.  Strictly
speaking,  the project does not make use of output targets  (demographic  levels or acceptor  yields).
There are to be separate evaluations  of the national  program  and of project activities  in four pilot
areas.  Base-line  and follow-up  KAP surveys are to be conducted. Ferility changes are to be
measured  by changes  in ASFRs  and TF which are to be determined  by special  surveys  and cross-
checked  with vital registrations  (births  and deaths)  and estimates  based on acceptor  statistics. One
annex  describes  and evaluates  the service  statistics  system  and needed  improvements.  Another  annex
(#26) analyzes the feasibility-with the government's  present program - of recruiting enough
acceptors,  and averting  enough  births, to reach the government  target of a NRR  of 1.0 by 2000  and
reducing  the '75 CBR  of 47 to 43 by '78.  The  analysis  shows  the government's  demographic  targets
to be unrealistic  even with maximum  performance  of the project.  The only hope of reaching  the
targets would  be to extend  the intensified  service and motivational  systems  throughout  the country,
to integrate FP with MCH care,  and to increase system efficiency-tasks for future projects.
Internal  and external  task forces will evaluate  the contribution  of each major project component  to
the program.
Pop  H  ('79):  Useful quantitative  review of program achievements  to  date, with
international  comparisons  (p. 12 ff.).  By 1978  the program  had succede  in recruiting  almost 50
percent more acceptors  than targeted  (note  that no targets were in the Pop-I SAR; they were set
subsequently  by the government). The absence  of continuation-rate  data prevent any estimate  of
demographic  impact, however.  In Pop-I,  evaluation  is handled by appointing  an inter-agency
government  committee  which is to "prepare  in consultation  with the Association  a comprehensive
plan of action for evaluating  the population  and health programs  and project including  its various
components  ...  This plan will: (a) define  the measurable  objectives  of each component;  (b) identify
corresponding  quantitative  performance  indicators;  (c) ascertain  the availability  of baseline  values  of
these indicators;  (d) determine  the data to be collected;  and (e) identify agencies  for carrying  out
specific  studies. Illustrations  of performance  indicators  and timetable  for evaluation  studies  are given
in Annexes  4 and 5"  but, alas, are illegible  because  of excessive  photo reduction. As in Pop-I, no
setting  of output targets  in the SAR (although  government  continued  to make heavy  use of them).30  Targcu  and  Indicators  in Bank  Populanion  Projects
Pop m  ('85): Compares program performance with targets during Second FOP (80-85)
and concludes that the major shortfalls partly reflect unrealisticaUy  high government targets
(demographic,  PP, and health). Mid-term  Bank and donor  advice led to adoption  of more realistic
targets. Long-term  FP and demographic  projections  are made, and "estimates"  are given (Annex  4)
of the number  of acceptors, by method,  by year, for the period '85-90.  Those (Bank)  estimates
constitute  defacto program  targets. The project commits  the government  to conduct  CPR surveys
in the first, third, and fifth  years of the project (weak  knowledge  of continuation  rates  was referred
to in Pop-i).  Because the project finances  "most of the major activities  of the national  family
planning  and MCH program . . . its benefits  cannot  be separated  from those of the program  as a
whole" (6.01).
Pop IV ('91):  Again, the Bank  feels that Fourth Plan demographic  and FP targets  are
too high-".  . . based on past experience and the maximum achieved by some of the best performing
FP programs  in the world,  more realistic  targets  would  be a CPR  of 45-50  percent,  a CBR  of 30-35
per 1,000 and a TFR of around 4."  The government's  quantitative  MCH and health targets are
stated (1.39) and presumably  accepted although  the only quantitative  health target used in the
statement  of project objectives  is to reduce  maternal  mortality  from "the  current  6-8  to 4-5 per 1,000
live births" (2.1). Annex 17 is a useful  one-page  summary  of "satisfactory  understandings"  reached
between  the Government  and its donors  on "demographic  targets,  the contraceptive  mix, the PP and
MCH service balance, and incentives." Annex 21 is a table showing  the government's  six-year
projections,  in percentage  terms  only, of the  distribution  of acceptors  by contraceptive  method;  a fn.
notes  that these  projections  are revised  semi-annuaUy  and "Major  revisions  tend  to occur .... "  By
now, the Bangladesh  Fertility Surveys  (permitting  estimates  of trends in ASFR and TF rates) and
CPR  surveys  appear  to have  become  institutionalized.  Also, there  has now  been  established  (starting
with P-pIM) an elaborate  series  of annual  technical  and program  reviews  with  the donors. Indicators
to be used for these  reviews  are specified  and include  the CPR, TFR, IMR, and EPI (immunization)
coverage  figures. It seems  fair to say that  the project  puts  greater  emphasis  on monitoring  the trends
of key indicators  than on the achievement  of specific  targets.
Botswana (1984)
The government  has no quantitative  fertility objectives  but does want to reduce the
population  growth  rate and therefore  wants  to make  FP advice  and materials  available  to all potential
parents.  This health project will be evaluated  (including  its PP impact) "by existing  information
systems  which  the project  wiU  strengthen."  USAID  will sponsor  a CPR  survey at the time of project
start-up  and is expected  to fund a second  one during  the project's final  year.  Without  establishing  any
quantitative  targets, the project's improved  MCH/FP services  "should  result in: (a) an increase  in
the numbers of acceptors of family planning; (b) more women breastfeeding;  (c) longer birth
intervals  resulting  from encouragement  of breastfeeding  and use of contraception;  and (d) decrease
in infant morbidity  and mortality  and healthier  mothers,  due to birth spacing  and improved  child
health" (6.02).  No quantitative  targets but trend monitoring  of PP through the use of standard
acceptor  data from service statistics  and CPR surveys.
Brazil (1986 & 1989)
The two very large basic health services  projects in the NE are directed  to expanding
and strengthening  the health system, with emphasis  on PHC as the primary means  of improving
maternal and child health.  The '86 SAR noted that population  and PP are sensitive  subjects  and
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fertility reduction, in order to avoid political conflict." The project will therefore support the
implementation  of family planning  services  through the government's  MCH services, "aiming  at
meeting  the spontaneous  demand,  and promoting  child  spacing  for health reasons,  and at creating  the
infrastructure  and organization  for the eventual  expansion  of these services"  (2.21).  Annex  5 lists
seven "indicators"  (=targets) to be reached "after five years of service"; only one of these relates
to FP and says only that in two of the project's four states  the system  will "have  met the request  of
contraceptives  to 100  percent of women,  except for those  with a medical  or legal contraindication."
The '89 project simply  extends  the basic  health system  farther and improves  its functioning,  with,
again, no reference  to demographic  or FP targets, nor to service  statistics.
Burkina (198S)
The country is in the initial stages of developing  a population  program, demographic
analysis,  and FP services. The  project  will  help  establish  aU  of these. As for monitoring,  the  project
will establish a number of baseline health indicators, including "the number of family planning
acceptors."
Burundi (1987)
An initial  Bank  project in a country  with a severe  population  problem. The promotion
and development  of birth spacing  and FP, and the improvement  of the demographic  data base for
population  policy development,  are two of the project's five explicit objectives. Each project
component  "has  a full set of quantitative  objectives,  including  outcome  and process  targets." These
include:  "(a) reducing  maternal  mortality  by 20 percent;  (b) reducing  infant  mortality  from 1215  per
12,000  to 100  per 1,000;  and (c) increasing  contraceptive  prevalence  from 1.6 percent  to 14  percent"
(by 1992  - in five years). These government  targets (called  "projections"  but viewed  as targets  by
both government  and Bank) are shown  in a table CT 12, Annex 1) listing PP users, the CPR, the
TFR, and births averted  for 1988-1992.  T. 13 shows  the projected  contraceptive  method  mix. The
basis for the acceptor target is explained in 3.17.  P.  18 of Annex 1 lists 17 "Key Project
Indicators," grouped  into three classes-"Process Indicators," "Outcome  Indicators,"  and "Impact
Indicators." [This  nomenclature  is not standard  in Bank  practice. Its use here  is consistent  with  Fig.
1 in the main report].
Colombia (1985)
This initial  project is in a country  with quite good data on fertility and contraceptive
prevalence  (there were two National  Fertility  Surveys,  and one Contraceptive  Prevalence  Survey,
between 1969-1980). The project will fund a new National  Contraweptive  Prevalence  Survey to
update  the '80 figures,  and a fertility  component  in a 1985  National  Health  Survey. Targets  for total
and new acceptors  were set for each of the project's nine health regions and sub-regions.  These
targets  "are based  on the  Government's  quantified  objective  of reducing  total fertility  rate (CMR)  from
4.3 to 4.0.  The figures  imply  an increase  in the contraceptive  prevalence  rate (CPR)  from about  37
percent to about 50 percent." Quantitative  health  targets are also specified.
Comoros (1983)
Government  just beginning  to show concern  for population  matters,  which are sensitive
and risk political  and religious  backlash  if pressed  too rapidly  or forcefully. But PP services  have
been permitted  as part of MCH services  for three years, although  a FP Division,  which the project32  Targcts  and  Indicators  in Bank  Population  Projecu
will  support,  has  just been  created. There  are no reliable  data  on contraceptive  prevalence,  estimated
at about 3 percent. Likewise,  no data exist on dropout  rates. As an initial  system-building  project
in a weak environment,  its principal  objective  is expressed  in these  words:  "By  the end of the project
the MPHP  should  be in a position  to provide  good  quality  basic  health-especially  MCH-and family
planning  services  in all primary  level facilities  ...  It would  have  the appropriate  facilities,  drugs,
equipment  and procedures  in place, and would  be carrying  out a plan  for the optimal  deployment  and
training of staff." The Bank's own  population  projections  show that if the CPR can be raised  from
the present  3 percent  to 22 percent  within  10 years (implying  the recruitment  of 9,000 new  acceptors
annually  by 1992),  the rate of population  increase  could be slowed  from 3.2 percent in 2005 to 2.3
percent-'a  realistic  objective  for the Comoros"  (2.06). With a stronger  but "still  attainable' effort,
the rate could be brought down to  1.8 percent.  These are targets the Bank is suggesting  to
Government  ....
Dominican Repubic (176)
The review of the government's  early-70's CBR  and CPR targets shows  them to have
been, even after downward  revision,  much  too optimistic. A new system  of service statistics  is a
considerable  improvement  and will be relied on, with new health statistics  which the project will
introduce,  to evaluate  program  and project performance. Evaluation  through service  statistics  will
be supplemented  by surveys  to establish  numbers  of acceptors,  continuing  users, active  clients, and
couple-years  of protection,  and to allow  estimates  of fertility  declines  based on ASFRs. "Program
efforts," or inputs, will also be evaluated  (e.g. personnel-hours,  cost, contraceptives  distributed).
The project concentrates  on improving  motivational  work and service delivery in two Regions.
Es6timates  of FP users and CPRs in the two Regions  show  nearly  three times as many  EP users vith
the project as without  it (within  five years); no attempt  is made to make quantitative  estimates  of
changes  in Regional  fertility,  however.
Egypt (1973 & 1978)
The Bank's two projects (in '73  and  '78)  encountered  a  difficult  administrative
environment  and did not succeed  in establishing  a continuing  Bankfborrower  relationship.  The first
found a  "middling"  CPR of 13-14  percent, a weak service-statistics  system, and a disappointing
growth-rate  of new  acceptors. The  government  had no recruitment  targets;  instead  it operated  a staff
incentive  scheme  whose  weaknesses  made  targets  look a more  attractive  system. The  project  did not
establish  any targets, however. Instead  it provided  for three operational  research studies  intended
to suggest  ways  of making  the program  more effective.
The '78 project  paid  much  more  attention  to targets,  monitoring,  and evaluation.  Starting
from a government  demographic  target to reduce  the CBR by one point per year over a  10-year
period (i.e., from 34 in 1972  to 24 by 1982)  the SAR  works  out targets  of required  acceptors  for the
nation  and the project Governorates.  The result  was an implied  CPR of 30.5 percent (up from an
estimated 18.2 percent in 1977)  and a need to recruit about 3.5 million  new acceptors  ('78=82).
The figures were also disaggregated  by project Governorates  and districts,  taking account  of their
considerable differences.  The derived results were considered "ambitious" and doubtful of
attainment; a more realistic target would be to allow two more years for doubling  the baseline
numbers  (3.13). To monitor  progress  towards  these  targets, the project  established  a new Research
and Development  Unit in the FP Dept. of the MOH. Among the Unit's functions  would be (a)
helping  the MOH's new Statistical  Unit (specially  established  to overcome  the serious  inadequacies
of the existing  FP service  statistics)  design  a management  information  system  for FP, (b) helping  theAnnex  M. Svnopes  of 'tarOting  '  in  past  reports  33
program  director set FP targets  in terms  of continuing  users and new acceptors,  and (c) evaluating
data on fertility and MCH in the project Governorates. The R&D Unit was also given funds to
mount  an external  research  program,  to be conducted  by Egyptian  institutions,  focused  on "primary
health care with emphasis  on MCH/FP."  Nine specific  priority studies  were listed.
Ethiopia (1988)
This is a pilot project to improve  the health status  primarily  of mothers  and children  in
two regions. Specific  health targets are set, as are simple  FP targets  (a) to provide FP services  at
all health facilities  as well as on a community-based  distribution  basis, and (b) to increase  the CPR
to  17 percent from the current 2 percent (over the project's eight-year disbursement  period,
presumably  -not specified). A target  distribution  of the contraceptive  mix  is also specified  (3.06  and
3.09). While "primary  emphasis  in monitoring  and evaluating  the project  would  be placed  on output
and process  indicators  ...  management  strengthening  and the  reactions  of project  beneficiaries  would
also be evaluated systematically"  (through an independent  management  review and sociological
assessments,  the latter to test beneficiaries'  KAP on FP, health, and nutrition  (5.07, 5.08).
Ghana (1985 & 1990)
This initial Bank  project in either of the two main social  sectors is intended-as part of
the Bank's support  for Ghana's economic  recovery  program- to provide  "emergency  assistance"  to
sectors  that have  been slipping  backwards  for several  years. In health, the principal  aim is therefore
to revive  a moribund,  ineffectual  delivery  system.  Vithin  health, "one of the major  obstacles  to an
effective family planning program would be addrt.  ',  i.e.,  convincing  health workers that family
planning  is an important  element  of maternal  and child health services." The project projects  that
the CPR  can be increased  from  around  5 percent  in 1985  to 16  percent  by 1988  (with  the  commercial
sector  contributing  seven  percentage  points, NUOs  three, and the MOH six-para.  35).  The 1990
project (which followed  a 1988 PHN sector review) identified,  as among the major PP program
issues, the need for "broad  target-setting  and active monitoring  of progress" and "adoption  of an
explicit  objective  of increasing  the number  of family  planning  acceptors/users  as fast as possible,  and
of specific  targets for the program"  (2.06). Annex  2-9 presents  the Bank's own longer-term  (1995
and 2000)  targets  for both population  and health. The key population  target is a CPR of 21 percent
by '95 and of 31 percent  by 2000; no demographic  targets are specified.
Guinea-Bissau  (1987)
This is an initial PHN project  in a weak, early-stage  system. Hence  major  emphasis  is
on basic  institutional  development  and the strengthening  of a PHC delivery  system. No quantitative
demographic  or PP goals are mentioned. The only explicit  PP goals are to conduct  (a) a FP study
aimed at  developing guidelines for  identifying  reproductive-risk  women (3.14) and  (b)  an
unelaborated  "special  policy  study" on family  planning  (one of four such studies  - 3.02).  Support
for in-service  training  will include material  on FP.
Haiti (1989)
The Bank's initial  assistance  to a chaotic,  poorly-financed,  administratively  top-heavy,
urban-biased  health system aims  primarily  to introduce  organizational  and policy  rationalization  as
a basis for more effective,  more equitable  future service  delivery. Thus dhe  project's contribution
to strengthening  FP during the project period will be extremely  modest; the main hope is that the34  Targets  and  Indcators  in Bank  Population  Projects
measuares  taken  to reform  and strengthen  the MCH/FP  system  will "lay  the basis for intensifying  PP"
in the future. A government  population  policy  paper was  due for completion  by March, 1990. No
demographic or FP targets are specified.  Annex 3 lists six "process  outputs" to be monitored and
three "outcome  outputs' for which  targets  are set: the only  PP activity  to be monitored  is the number
of sterilizations  performed  on (a) men and (b) women.
India (1972-1990)
The  Bank  has  been  assisting  the Indian  population  program  continuously  since  1973  when
the first of its seven  projects  was approved. These  SARs  wiU  be reviewed  together,  using Roman
numerals  I-VII and para. numbers to refer to individual  reports and projects.  Each of the seven
projects  addresses  the problem  in a different,  well-defined  area where, through  the project, intensive
efforts  are made  to improve  program  performance.  All seven  SARs  begin  by reviewing  the national
program-OI  policy,  demographic  and acceptor  trends, broad program  strategy  and organization,
major  problems  that exist, arrangements  for monitoring  and evaluation  and the underlying  data-base,
and similar relevant  background  topics. Each project then develops  a strategy  for extending  and
improving  the program  within  its chosen  area.  The strategy  may be the government's  or a mixture
of Bank-suggested  and government  strategy  for intensive  application  in the project  area.. Throughout
this 18-year period, Bank reports have shown a  strong interest in monitoring and evaluation,
including  the making  of projections,  target-setting,  and operational  research  (research  studies  to see
what works well, what less well).  A constant  Bank concern  has been to deepen  and improve  the
quality of the data-base  on which  performance  judgments  rest.
India-I  was so impressed  with the inadequacies  of the Indian  program's  data-base  that
it made the establishment  of two independent  (i.e., not university-attached,  like some 16 others)
Population  Centers  a major part of the project. These were charged  with designing  an improved
management  information  and evaluation  system (MES), of which service statistics would be a
centerpiece,  and to engage  in program-relevant  demographic  analysis  and operational  research. This
was an attempt  at major institution-building  in support  of monitoring  and evaluation. In addition,
SAR-I  contains  an impressive  18-pp.  annex  on demographic  and acceptor  targets  for each of the two
project areas.  It is a model of cautious, explicit  projections  that show three possible outcomes
depending on differing  assumptions.  Indeed, as is so often the case with low-medium-high
projections,  only the medium  one deserves  to be called  a target (low projections  normally  assume
little or no performance  improvement,,  only a slow  expansion  at existing  efficiencies,  while high
projections  are usuaUy  based on assumptions  more  optimistic  than it is reasonable  to expect). The
GOI has long made strong  use of targets, in the sense  of "this  is what your  administrators  expect of
you."  Bank SARs never show a  comparison  between its area targets and those set (mainly by
administrative  fiat)  by government  administrators.  Presumably  (because  Bank  projections  are more
realistic  and less hortatory)  their targets  would  almost  always  be lower than the Government's.
The two major Population Centers did not develop as  rapidly, or with as mucb
operational  relevance  and support,  as originally  hoped. SAR-i reported  that after six years they  had
become  weU  established  but SAR-III  complained  that they seemed  somewhat  isolated  and academic
in their work; SAR-IV  credits them with having  made some valuable  operational  studies  and with
having  improved  the MIES  in the two states  they were meant  to serve.  This is the last we hear of
this major  innovation-although  aUl  projects  talk about  local data inadequacies  and support  early and
late surveys  to provide  area data against  which performance  judgments  can be made. A conmplaint
made  in several  of the projects  is that almost  no data exist  on continuation  rates,  making  it impossibleAlme  M. Snops  of "targetigga  in post reports  35
to translate  acoeptance  data into demographic  impacts  except by use of norms imported  from other
countries.
By 1983  (Pbp-Ill two major  Bank  and (OI concerns  with the program  were (a) the need
to give  greater emphasis  to MCH activities  as a basis for increasing  the demand  for PP and (b) that
the national  program  had over-emphasized  sterilization  and had not given enough  emphasis  to the
temporary  methods  that might  attract  more  younger  couples. Simple  MCH targets  therefore  appear,
alongside  the  former  acceptor  and demographic  targets/projections.  In addition  the broad area  targets
now reflect  the desired  shift in method-mix. Pop-IV  continues  with method-mix  targets and, like
some  of its predecessors,  sponsors  some  baseline  area surveys  for later performance  measurement-
and which "will  provide  more precise  values  for the project indicators  [a disappointingly  summary
one-page  arnex is repeated  from earlier projects . . .J on the basis of which agreement  will be
reached with the Bank on this project's quantitative  goals." It is not clear how these post-project
goals relate to those already expressed  in the SAR.
PNp-V  is an urban  project  but the targeting/monitoring/evaluation  problems  are familiar
ones. A text table presents  input  and output  targets  in exceptionally  clear format. Input targets  are
limited  to the expansion  of physical  facilities  (nothing  on staff  numbers,  training  courses, EEC  work);
outputs  are expressed  as "service  delivery  achievements"  and refer to a CPR target, a desired  shift
in method  mix, and coverage  with simple  MCH  procedures. Once again,  the project  will fund base-
line and end-of-project  surveys  to generate  performance  data.
By the end of the '80s the GOI and the Bank were both convinced  that improving  the
quality  of MCH services  could play a key role in increasing  the demand  for, and effectiveness  of,
PP services. In Pop-VI and -VI staff training is viewed  as the key to quality improvements. In
Pp-VI three scenarios  are worked  out to show  the effect  on the TFR of differing  assumptions  about
how improved  training may affect  acceptance  rates, the method  mix, and continuation  rates.  The
results  have to be taken on faith as the tables are not backed  up by explanations  (indeed,  the annex
numbers  do not seem  to agree with those used in the text).
SARs  VI and VI each reflect  a feeling  that both the Bank and the GOI give too much
emphasis  to quantitative  acceptor  and demographic  data  and not enough  to qualitative  judgments  and
operational  research  (1.13). SAR-VH  notes  that "the  performance  indicators  which  are most heavily
relied on include estimates  of target achievement. These  tend to over-emphasize  the achievement
of method-specific  (sterilization  and IUCD) quotas and under-emphasize  other dimensions  of the
revised  program  strategy,  particularly  the  delivery  of priority  maternal  and child  health  services. The
project would  assist the State in developing  improved  measurements  of program  outcome,  and train
workers  and managers  in the use of these measures  and the interpretation  of the data generated."
Areas  within  the five  states  that develop  alternative  indicators  are to be released  from "present  target-
setting  procedures"  (2.36). The SAR  nevertheless  contains  three-scenario  projections,  although  these
end with a cautionary  note that "projections  of increases  in contraceptive  prevalence  are difficult
because . . . current continuation  rates for temporary  methods  are unknown, and also because
changes  in the number  of acceptors  from year  to year for all methods  have been  quite erratic.'  The
most one can say, then, is that if the project is able to achieve  its process  objectives,  prevalence  and
fertility  outcomes  should  come correspondingly  closer  to scenario  B than to scenario  A" (p.  136).
Indonesia (19724991)36  Targets  and Indicators  in Bank Population  Projects
The Bank's five projects reflect a continuous  association  with this highly successful
program  since  it moved  into  high gear about 1970. The Bank's  initial  help  was precisely  to help  the
government  set targets for the program: in late 1969  the Bank  joined the UN and WHO in a joint
mission  to suggest  the scale and type of program  the GOI should  organize. The mission's  report
suggested  the government  should  aim at recruiting  6 million  new acceptors between  1971-76;  this
was double  the target of the then-current  five-year  plan. The government  accepted  the figure  (even
increasing it slightly) and developed  a  program that followed  closely the three-agency  report.
Thereafter the government has set  annual new-acceptor  targets, steadily raising them, with
performance  consistently  beating  them.
The first ('72) Bank  project  devoted  considerable  attention  to starting  up evaluation  and
research  studies,  and supported  needed  continuation-rate  and KAP  surveys  (the  best summary  of P-I's
E&R work is in para. 4.07 of SAR-II). A six-page  annex in SAR-I (no. 38) provides  one of the
clearest  explanations  anywhere  of how long-run  acceptor  targets should  be set.  After this initial
project, however,  the next three SARs  show far less concern  for evaluation,  research,  and targeting
than one finds, for example,  in Bank  projects  in such other major  countries  as Bangladesh  or India.
Concern  for these  matters returns with a thunderclap  in SAR-V,  however. A principal  explanation
of the relative silence  of projects i1,1,  and IV on these matters is that other donors were much
concerned  with them and Bank 'neglect" of them reflected  a division  of labor.
The Bank  was not completely  silent  on targets  after 1972. In the second  (1977)  project,
the Bank stated its agreement  with the 001's  CBR target of 34 by '84 and with the very large
acceptor  targets this implied. The Bank  justified  its acceptance  of these  high targets  by referring  to
the program's  very strong  recent  performance.  The  project  also supported  an interesting  experiment
with a  'community  incentive  scheme"  in 14 kecamatans  to see if the offering  of communal  prizes
(more  money  for community  development  projects)  would  be effective  in raising  local CPRs  to target
levels  (a 16-page  annex  describes  the experiment).  Later ARs  make  no reference  to this experiment,
and the subsequent  development  of a community-based  approach  to recruitment  and supply  (perhaps
the distinctive  hallmark  of the Indonesian  program)  appears  not to have been modeled  on it." 3
PNp-m  ('80)  contains an  excellent short review of  acceptor targets and program
performance  during  the '70s. The  project  notes and accepts  the GOI's demographic  target  of cutting
in half the country's 1971  fertility  rate by 1990; it also accepts  the 50 percent  increase  in acceptor
targets for '80-84 as compared  with '75-79.  But it is only in SAR-IV  ('85) that we see interest  in
looking at the effectiveness  of high acceptance  rates-the  project commits the government  to
conducting  biannual  surveys  to establish  CPR and continuation  rates (Prof. Freedman  notes that  the
continuation-rate  figures accepted  by government  and donors in the mid-80s  appear to have been
serious over-estimates). 14  The project also reflects  some disappointment  with the performance  of
"See Prof. Ronald  Freedman's  discussion  of the communal  structure  of the program  at pp. 15-16  of his report  for
OED, Tb. World  Bank  and Indonceia's  Population  ProaMM  (February  13, 1991,  48 pp., Bank  rept. no. 9370).
" 4The information  system,  which  produced  credible  estimates  of prevalence  until  at least 1976,  subsequently  greatly
exaggerated  the rise of prevalence  rates, especially  between  1982-83  and 1985-86.  Exaggeration  of prevalence  rtes  by
15-20  absolute  percentage  points  resulted  in gross  overestimates  of resources  needed  for maintenance  and gross
underestimates  of new  users  required  to reach  targeted  levels.  The  lusion  that abnormally  large reported  prevalence
increases  wero  roal  created  a temporary  euphoria  that was  misleading  about  what was  possible  in short  time  periods.  *(2p
s,iL  p.  19).  A Bank  review  in 1986  analysed  this problem  in some  depth  but Freedman  says  that changes  made  since  then
have  not prevented  the ystem  from generating  prevalence  rats  that are still miseadingly  high.Ann= M.  Synopses  of ftargedg  *  in  past reports  37
Indonesia's  demographic  institutions  and provides  funds  for the training  of more demographers. It
also provides  major  funding  for three new  research  centers  (for FP Studies,  FP Policy  Development,
and Biomedical  and Human Reproduction)  to be established  by the National Family Planning
Coordinating  Board.
As noted, Pbp-V ('91) shows  a greatly heightened  interest in evaluation  and research
matters. The interest  in not primarily  with  the nature  or validity  of GOI demographic  and acceptor
targets.  It is directed  instead to the evaluation  of project components  and to the development  of
indicators  for routine 'process' and "performance'  monitoring  for each project component. ". .
. Recent evaluations,"  the SAR states, "draw attention  to lack of adequate  indicators  as to what
targets project components  should meet; in the absence  of such targets, performance  judgments
become rather subjective" (2.09).  Perhaps drawing on the Bank's work in Bangladesh,  P-V
introdvces  the use of Annual Implementation  Plans, which are to be submitted  for Bank review
before  a new Annual  Review  Mission  every October. The  Implementation  Plans (to be prepared  by
each of BKKBN's  project-implementing  units) are directed  to include "performance  and process
indicators." To help Indonesian  staff develop  appropriate  indicators,  SAR-V  contains  four annexes
(no.s  6-9, totaling  27 pp.) which  suggest  how  the "process  indicators"  problem  might  be handled  for
each major  project component. This seems  a daunting  task, and one may fairly ask if this kind of
detailed tracking and reporting (which goes considerably  beyond normal project implementation
reporting)  is worth doing.  Such monitoring  asks if specific  tasks are getting done; it does not
evaluate  the design, impact,  or cost-effectiveness  of tasks  and whether  they deserve  to be continued,
modified,  or dropped in favor of possible  other means of accomplishing  an objective. In short,
component  monitoring  should  not be mistaken  for operational  research:  the Bank  needs  to give more
attention  to this distinction  and to what types(s)  of evaluations  it and its clients most need (or what
the balance should be betweena  them).  Pop-V also provides for external technical assistance
(involving  a two-year  residency-TOR  in annex  10)  to review  the program's  management  information
system (IS),  essentially  the service-statistics  system.  With the program now undergoing  some
major changes  in direction  (including  a new emphasis  on privatizing  many activities,  and stronger
attempts  to serve hard-to-reach  groups)  it is felt that the present service-statistics  system may no
longer  provide  the routine data the program  should  be getting.
bran  (1973)
This project (later canceled)  does not contain  any output  targets  of any kind.  There  is
a review  of the service  statstics system, and comments  on the weakness  of evaluation  and research
activities,  but nothing  more.
Ivory Coast (198)
This initial  project intends  to help convert  a recently  prw-natalist,  anti-FP country  with
almost  no demographic  data  into one  with basic  demographic  data  and a remodeled  MCH  system  (but
without PP services, although  nurse training is to cover that topic).  The project will fund the
country's first census. The main population  "targets"  are to produce  basic data, encourage  a shift
in government  population  policy,  and bring  the MCH system  to a stage  of development  where it can
begin to offer child-spacing  services.
Jamaica (1970-87)38  Targets  and Indicators  in Bank Populaion Projects
This series of three projects shows modest, explicit, and increasing interest in output
targets.  P-I was the Bank's first population operation. It takes note of the GOJ's hope that the CBR,
which was 35 when the program started in 1968, can be reduced to 25 by 1975.  In a summary and
somewhat simplistic paragraph, the SAR makes use of acceptor data from neighboring Barbados and
notes that if the government's acceptor targets are met it could result in a high enough CPR to meet
the 1975 demographic target.  The project provided for an annual external review during each of its
four  years  "to  assist  the  government in  establishing and  maintaining high  standards  of  cost-
effectiveness, i.e.,  so that  the Board,  the government, and  the Bank will have an  independent
judgment on whether or not the program is being conducted at acceptable levels of efficiency and
to identify specific problems requiring special attention."  An annex listed 24 specific questions  these
reviews might consider; these included looking at the establnhment of local acceptor targets and at
efforts to establish continuation rates.
Pop-II contained funding for  the  calculation (from  FP  service statistics) of  ASPRs
annually, 1976-80. Funds were also provided for studies of service statistics (and follow-up surveys,
if needed) of method-specific dropout rates, which were not yet known.
Pop-M avoids taking a position on the GOJ's very ambitious target of raising the CPR
from the 1983 figure of 43 percent to 70 percent (a very high figure, by world standards) in 1991.
The SAR says only that "The project will support MOH efforts to improve the family planning
service delivery programs in support of the Government effort to increase contraceptive prevalence
from 40 percent in 1983 to around 70 percent by 1991." A mid-term project evaluation by the MOH
"will include assessment of the contraceptive prevalence rate," which can be compared with results
of the 1983 CPR USAID-funded survey.  A one-page annex explains the relationship between CPRs
and fertility projections, which are presented to 2005.
Jordan (1985)
This initial PHC project provides  reasonable  data on the amount  and sources of FP
services  available  in an environment  where the govermment  has no population  policy  and PP is still
a sensitive  subject  and is normally  referred  to in terms of child-spacing  as a private  health benefit.
The MOH  does offer contraceptive  services  as one of its MCH services,  although  the private sector
is the major source of supply. Most of the project's targets  are health targets; among  these are a
specific  target of raising the MOH's share in the CPR from 1 percent to 6 percent.  If this is
reached, the SAR estimates  that the overall CPR  will rise from 26 percent  to 31 percent. But that
remains  a Bank  projection,  not a project or even  a government  target.
Kenya (194-90)
The four Kenya projects between 1974 and 1990 provide an ironic lesson in target-
setting: all the acceptor  targets  in the first three projects  were wildly  missed. Those  of the first two
projects  were not nearly  attained,  and generated  a widespread  mood  of disappointment  and frustration
among  government  and donors  that the ambitious  program  just was not working. Then suddenly,
unexpectedly  demand  began  to explode  around the end of 1987. By the end of 1988  the carefully
set targets for that year had been greatly  exceeded-and fears developed  that the country  might  run
out of supplies. P-IV in 1990  is essentially  an emergency  contraceptive  supply  project  to make  sure
supplies  would  be adequate  to accommodate  the unexpected  explosion  in demand. Almost  a decade
and a half of unexpected  disappointment,  followed  by three years of unexpected  success. Targets
provided  psychological  baselines  that fed these mood-swings  (service statistics,  providing  routineAnnx  H. Snopss  of "targoeing  win  past reports  39
monitoring  measurements,  obviously  push in the same directions  but without the fillip of target-
comparisons).
Pop-I  was  based  on Bank  acceptance  of GOK  health, demographic,  and acceptor  targets
(4.02); indeed the Bank had helped prepare them.  Annex 23 of the SAR then worked out the
favorable  demographic  outcomes  which attainment  of the acceptor  targets would mean, with their
benefits to the economy.  P-II noted the program's  disappointing performance and offered some
reasons  to explain  it (3.17-3.19). Pop-II  was designed  to try to overcome  the perceived  constraints.
Acknowledging  the difficulty  of setting targets  for a 'stalled" program, the SAR nevertheless  said
it would "not be unreasonable  to expect  an increase  in the contraceptive  prevalence  rate from about
5  percent now to between  10 percent and  17 percent by the end of 1987 ...  . This would be
refected in a decline  in the CBR  from about  53 per thousand  now to between  51 and 48 by 1987,
approximately"  (4.04). No disaggregated  regional  or district  targets appear  in the SAR.
SAR-II  contains  an excellent  (and the only)  definition  of the three types  of targets  which
a project may contain-targets for inputs, processes  and outputs (7.12).
Pop-M (1988)  noted  the program's  disappointing  performance  over the previous  decade,
blamed it on a gap between govermnent  and private perceptions  of the benefits  of PP and on
lingering  reluctance  to discuss  population  matters  openly,  and then went on to establish,  for the new
project, a more detailed  and explicit  set of targets than  either of its predecessors. The P-Il  targets
(Annex  3) use a model developed  by Bongaarts  and Stover at the Population  Council  to work out
district-by-district  targets, by contraceptive  method, for each of the four project  years (1988-1991).
This is perhaps  the most explicit  and most detailed  set of acceptor  targets to be found in any of the
75 Bank SARs. In addition  to setting  acceptor  targets, the project gave considerable  attention  to
strengthening  the institutional capacities for population research, and to  the development  of
mechanisms to  conduct "comprehensive  evaluations of  GOK and  NGO population program
activities." Independent  evaluations  of program sub-components  are to be conducted, by local
consultants  and organizations,  in the second  and fourth years of the project. This, at minimum,  was
a token bow to the need  for operational  research  (2.09-2.10)
SAR-IV  has the pleasant  task of reporting  the dramatic  program  turn-around  which had
resulted  in making  the P-I  targets obsolete  even before  that project was out of the starting  gate.
SAR-IV  gives no acceptor targets but presents a table of "contraceptive  usage, 1990-1994' the
underlying  assumptions  for which  are in Working  Paper I in the project  file (not  in an SAR  annex).
The  project provides  for biannual  surveys  to monitor  the CPR. The  project  also provides  for annual
work  plans 'based on a component-by-component  review  of progress  in the preceding  year." A mid-
term project review  will also be conducted-an operational  review,  if not operational  research ....
Korea (1979)
This project,  in a country  with  an outstandingly  successful  FP program,  contains  explicit
output  (demographic  and acceptor)  targets. The aim is to reduce the CBR  from 24.3 in '76 to 23.9
by '81 and to 22.9 by '86.  "To do this it is necessary  to increase  the number  of current usen of
contraceptives  from 2.0 million  in 1976  to 3.1 million  in 1981  and 3.9 million  in 1986." The report
notes the existence  of effective  domestic  demographic,  PP, and health-research  institutes  capable  of
generating  and analyzing  the data needed  for setting  targets  and monitoring  performance  (2.35). But
since  the project  will  establish  some  new  service-delivery  systems  for which  a new  reporting  system.
and end-of-project  evaluations  will be needed,  funds  are provided  to support  these activities  (3.18).40  Targets  and Indicators  in Bank Populadon  Projects
Quasi-targets  are set for the new  MCH facilities  which  the project  will establish: "By  the end of the
project period, the MCH centers  should  be able to handle  about 150,000  births a year or about  30
percent  of the number  of births in mral areas. In addition,  the multipurpose  workers  would  have  the
capacity  to help in about  200,000  deliveries  at home. This compares  with direct  attendance  for only
about 27,000  births at present.  The services  provided  by these workers  ...  will reach at least 50
percent of the rural population. It is estimated  that about ten million  people would be provided
primary  health care services  under the project" (5.01).
Lesotho (1985  & 1989)
Although  this southern  African  country  does not yet have a formal population  policy,
the government  clearly recognizes  the need to control  population  growth,  has made several strong
statements a support  of FP, and will use the project to strengthen  the provision  of PP services  as
part of its MCH services. No demographic  targets  have yet been  set by national  planners;  the SAR
does not go beyond  the inclusion  of normal  Bank  three-scenario  population  projections. The SAR
estimates  that this MCH/FP/Health  project should  result  in an increase  in the CPR from  5.5 percent
at present  to 8 percent  by project completion. Beyond  this, the report  notes only that the project's
combined  components  "would  all lay the groundwork  for a more substantial  impact  on fertility  in a
subsequent  project" (6.02).
The subsequent  project came along  four years later (1989).It  again  uses standard  Bank
projections to estimate future population  size (in 2000 and 2050) "If Lesotho is successful  in
promoting  an accelerated  decline  in fertity  ...  . While  it will not be easy for Lesotho  to pursue
this latter scenario,  the experience  of other  developing  regions  suggests  that it is achievable"  (2.10).
The Fourth Plan ('87-91) sets a target of raising  the CPR from under 10 percent  to 25 percent. The
SAR, citing  recent  rapid increases  in contraceptive  use in neighboring  countries,  comments  that "this
target is probably  achievable' (2.12).  Later the report estimates  that the project will deliver }P
information  'and contmceptive  methods"  to about 60,000 women  by the end of the project period
(6.03).  Project impact  is to be evaluated  by three studies (covering  FP, food and nutrition, and
disease  control)  to be done late in the project  by independent  local and foreign  consultants  (TOR  are
left for later). Baseline  data are not entirely  absent  but are weak ....  Input targets  for FP training
are explicit, and a date is specified  by which the Government  is to finalize  its population  policy
(3.13).  The SAR contains  no discussion  of service statistics  but the project will fund a 'Health
Information  Systems  Advisor"  to review  and make  recommendations  on "MOH's  basic  data needs."
Mladagascar  (1988)
This is not a PHN project but the operation  does address  population  and PP as part of
a stucural  adjustment  operation. The Government's  Letter of Development  Policy  notes that the
Government  "is resolved  to promote  greater consistency  between  the economic  growth  rate and the
population  growth  rate" and that a new  Population  and Development  Unit in the planning  agency  will
submit  to Government,  by July '89, a proposed  population  policy. The only FP services  now  being
provided  come from a Non-governmental  Organization  (NGO)  to which  the government  "proposes
to extend assistance ...  to enable it to improve and extend its operations .... "  (p.51).  With the
help of this assistance  "the recruitment  of 15,000  new clients"  by the PP NGO would  be possible.
That one output target is matched  by specific  input targets, among which are the training of 250
motivators  and 750 health  professionals  to be trained  in PP clinical  skills (3.10). Such  is this initial
operational  nudge  to a country  in the very early stages of dealing  with an admitted  but still sensitive
problem.Annex IM.  Synopses of  'targeuing  0 in past  reports  41
Malawi  (1983-1991)
Malawi  is one of several  African  countries  which,  partly as a result  of dialogue  with  the
Bank, have  begun  to recognize  their population  problems  and have  moved  to introduce  FP as a child-
spacing  program  within  their MCH services. Pop-I  accepts  the Government's  Child Spacing  Plan
and supports  the introduction  of FP services,  but without  any targets.  . . . The project will not
directly  lead to any amelioration  of health problems  or reduce  health indicators  to acceptable  Umits;
without  the project interventions,  however,  the Government  would  not be able to do this effectively
in the future"  (6.01). Input  targets  for system  expansion  (numbers  of facilities  at which FP services
are to be offered,  staff numbers  to be trained)  are specified  (3.30,3.31).
Four years later (1987)  Pop-II  noted  the evolution  of government  and public attitudes,
the "rapid  and unforeseen  growth  in demand"  for FP services,  and the over-fulfillment  of the training
targets  in Pop-I. The second  project  was therefore  able to deal explicitly  with future output  targets.
With  an estimated  present  CPR of 2 percent  and a TFR of 7.7, the government  target of raising  the
CPR to 10 percent  by 1991  would bring the TFR down  to about 7, the number  of FP users would
increase  about  45 percent  to 55,000,  and population  in 2015 would  increase  only 70 percent, not the
200 percent  if fertility  were to remain unchanged. A table presents  the estimated  numbers  of users,
by method, for 1987,1988,  and 1989. "A paper detailing how these targets were calculated  is
available  in the project flles" (by R. Bulatao). Performance  towards  goals will be monitored  by a
number  of "process  indicators"  [specified]  as well as "several  surveys  and studies" [specified];  they
are to include "annual  impact  studies  of various  programs"-unspecified.
Pop-IE  (Feb. '91? - date omitted  from SAR)  notes  that although  the government  has no
explicit  population  policy,  it has begun  to more  actively  promote  its child-spacing  program,  now  quite
widely  available. However,  the Bank  had come  to feel that the Pop-II  CPR target of 10 percent  by
1991  (a Government  target which  the Bank  had apparently  accepted)  was now  unrealistic  and should
be postponed  to 1995/96. Six percent should  be taken as an "interim"  1992 target.  To monitor
progress  towards  its contraceptive  target, new family  formation  surveys  will be undertaken  (one in
April 1992, another three years later).  No review  of service  statistics  is to be found in this or in
either of its two predecessor  SARs.
Malaysia (1972 & 1978)
Two projects  were all the Bank FP assistance  the government  sought  before sensitive
ethnic rivalries ended  earlier interest in slowing  national  population  growth. Although  Pop-I  had
very explicit  demographic  targets, set by the National  PP Board, and global  acceptor  targets, there
was  not yet any PP strategy  that related  program  activities  to the Board's  targets. An extended  annex
argued  that the Board's acceptor  targets  were too low; the project  would  permit raising  them by 40
percent.  An important  part of the project was the selection  of 14 districts as "Intensive  Input
Demonstration  Areas"  to test the ability  of special  efforts  to recruit higher levels  of acceptors. No
targets for those areas appear in the SAR, however,  and although  there is clear assurance,  there is
no description  of the "detailed  evaluation  of this demonstration"  that  the project  will conduct,  beyond
a reference  to "special  management  and research  studies  and surveys  by the research  advisers and
a management  consulting  firm"  (annex  5, p. 2). Since  all research  on Malaysian  population  problems
had been done by expatriates,  local evaluation/research  capacity  was extremely  weak; the project
provided  support  for its strengthening  (4.01-v).42  Targets  and Indicators  in Bank Population  Projects
Pop-II  (1978)  accepts  the government's  demographic  and acceptor  targets  but notes  that
their validity  will depend  on a shift from less to more-effective  contraceptive  methods. The CBR
is to be brought  down  to 26 by 1985, which  will require  a CPR of 44 percent  (vs. c. 40 percent in
'74-75). The improvement  of the method  mix is assumed  to require a shift to a higher proportion
of acceptors in the government  program and a decreased  proportion  from non-program  sources
(2.21).  The project funds a built-in evaluation  system "on the basis of quantitative  indicators
specified  by [the government]"  ["a listing  of these  indicators  is given in Annex  3": these list eight
project  components,  the "objective"  for each,  the "quantitative  indicators"  to be used, and the "status
and sources  of measures.' Nearly  two  years of technical  assistance  is provided  for project  evaluation
work.  Additional  TA, plus other funding, is provided  to build up the Research,  Evaluation  and
Management  Information  System-relying  heavily  on recommendations  of the External  Review  Team
under Pop-I (4.61-4.66).
Mall  (1983  &  1991)
This was the first Francophone  country  of W. Africa  to accept  FP as part of its MCH
services. In 1983  the CPR was estimated  at 0.2 percent.  UNFPA  had recently  helped  establish  a
population  unit in the Planning  Ministry  to work on development  of a population  policy. Pop-I is
overwhelmingly  a primary  health care (PHC)  project;  as MCH services  are improved,  and the high
infant  mortality  rate declines,  increases  in FP will  be slow. No demographic  or acceptor  targets are
mentioned. Most  of the project's "process  indicators"  (Annex  I, T. 7) are health indicators;  among
them will be "the  number  of FP acceptors."
Pop-H (1991) shows a much stronger Bank and government  interest in population.
Although  primarily  a health project, it aims to raise the national  CPR from 1.2 percent in 1991  to
8.5  percent by 1997.  A draft population policy from the planning agency (1990) proposed
demographic  targets  that were unrealistically  high; a more modest  operational  plan from the MOH
is judged actionable  and is accepted  (2.33-2.34). The project, which  will reach  nearly one-third  of
the population,  aims to raise the CPR in the project  area from I percent in 1989  to 10 percent  in
1997  (3.53).  A 29-pp. Annex  on "Population  and Family  Planning"  includes  a table, based on the
"World  Bank  standard  fertility  decline  scenario,"  on the projected  number  of users, by method,  1990-
2000-the last page  of an annex  overwhelmingly  concerned  with the program  details  of the project's
FP component.
Morocco (1985)
While the government  recognizes  the drag of too-rapid  population  growth, it has shied
away from explicit  demographic  targets.  It has, however,  provided  strong support for FP as part
of its MCH services,  which  have clear FP objectives. Within  the project  area (three  provinces),  the
target is to raise the average CPR from 22 percent in 1985 to 33 percent by 1989 through a
combination  of reaching out to rural women, improving  continuation  rates, and offering  a wider
range  of methods  (2.06-b). The average rate is disaggregated/differentiated  for each of the three
provinces;  interim  as weU  as end-of-project  (1989)  targets are given. In addition,  the project aims
to increase  women's  knowledge  of modern  contraceptive  methods  from the present  63 percent  to 90
percent by 1989 (Annex C, p.2).  The conceptual  statement of the project's monitoring and
evaluation  activities  is unusually  clear, i.e., the division  of indicators  among inputs, outputs, and
outcomes  (4.12).  The project wiU  fund a number  of technical  evaluation  studies, some of which
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Niger (1986)
This is a basic health-system  project in a country  that is only just beginning  to show
concern  for population  problems,  where FP is still a sensitive  problem, but where the government
is willing  to offer PP services  as part of its MCH facilities. UNFPA  and USAI) have  been  playing
a stronger  role in encouraging  the government  to focus  on its population  problem  and the project  will
support, mainly through studies, their efforts  to get population  and FP policies  adopted. There is
no attempt  to set demographic  or outcome  targets of any kind.
NigerIa (1985, 1988, & 1991)
The  Bank  has been  following  the evolution  of Nigeria's  population  problems  and policies
since  the '70s.  From an unconcerned,  pronatalist,  anti-FP  political  and cultural  posture  the country
(or at least  the Government)  has moved  to a highly  concerned,  strongly  pro-PP position. When,  in
the mid-'eighties,  the government  became  interested  in Bank assistance  in the health sector it was
agreed  to develop  a series of health  projects  on a state-by-state  basis. The Sokoto  and Imo projects
were  the initial  steps  down  this road. As national  concern  heightened,  however,  the Government  and
Bank both realized that a state-by-state  approach  would be a much slower response  to health and
population  problems  than a direct, nation-wide  approach. Hence the development  of the highly
innovative  Pop-m, an explicitly  National  Population  Project (April, 1991).
The first two (state) projects  incorporated  population  and PP objectives  within wider
health projects  that emphasized  strengthening  of PHC. The introduction  of PP as one of the basic
MCH services  did of course require  special  training of female  health workers; the training  targets
(4.16) had to be extremely  modest. The output  target is perhaps the most cautious  to be found in
any Bank  project: "The  number  of family  planning  acceptors  at the health clinics  is expected  to rise
with the training of CH workers  and TBAs  in family  planning' (7.02). [T.12, Annex  I, provides  a
set of "indicators' for monitoring  the project; the only PP indicator,  however, is the 'no. of FP
acceptors"-for which  annual targets  are to be fixed,  annually.
Pop-il in Imo (1988)  contains  a more direct  attack  on population  problems,  in line with
changed  national  policy.  It is concerned  with creating  a State Population  Council, a Population
Studies  Center at the State  university,  and strengthening  PP in the state MOH.  Among  the future
work  of the Population  Studies  Center  would  be the conduct  of baseline  surveys,  operational  research
and impact  studies-but no dates  or details  are set.  No output  targets  are mentioned. Staff  training
to be supported  by the project gives heavy  emphasis  to FP, with targeted  numbers  of courses  and
trainees (Table,  Annex 3-11).
The central government  finally adopted  a national  population  policy, and launched  a
National Poplation Programme,  in early 1989. The policy contains 11 quantitative  targets, the
achievement  of which "will be extremely  difficult  and very expensive."  Annex 2-5 of the SAR
presents these targets, "most of which appear . . . unrealistic within the time frame set."
Notwithstanding,  "a commendable  step has been taken by Nigeria in setting  such a broad array of
concrete  targets for itself." The SAR comments  that "it would be highly unfortunate  if Nigeria's
inability  to come even close to achieving  most of its population  targets were to result in a loss of
interest on the part of the Government  and external  agencies  and a coUapse  of morale of program
staff and managers."  (2.11). The Bank  does not suggest  revised  targets; it does however  include  its
standard  population  projection  tables, using a three-scenario  approach  of fast, medium, and slow
fertility  declines.44  Targett  and Indicators  in Bank  Population  Projects
The SAR  is primarily  concerned  with launching  a highly  innovative  and admittedly  risky
operational  program, and with the development  of mechanisms  for monitoring  its progress. The
project consists  essentially  of establishing  a national  line-of-credit  (the Population  Activities  Fund)
on which  any agency,  public  or private,  can draw to finance  population  activities  it can get approved
by a controlling  authority. This  will generate  many  scattered,  dissimilar  sub-projects  which it would
be difficult  or impossible  to monitor  by "most  conventional  measurement  tools such  as contraceptive
prevalence  surveys." But "simple  indicators"  will be worked  out, an existing  experimental  survey
system (the Sentinel  Survey System, developed  at the Univ. of North Carolina, and described  in
Annex 3-9) will be spread over a much wider area (4.14). Annex 2-8 notes that "The overall
approach  to monitoring,  evaluation,  and, to a lesser extent, research activities still needs to be
developed  for the National Population  Programme." The three-page  annex suggests "a possible
framework."
Paklstan  (1983)
This was an attempt  by the Bank  and co-financiers  to help a revised  national  program
make a fresh start.  Some Bank assistance  was national  but assistance  for service delivery was
concentrated  on 13 districts. In those districts  the outcome  targets  were to raise the CPR from 7
percent  in 1983  to 14.5 percent in 1986. That target "implies"  a reduction  in the CBR of about 3
points in the project districts. Those targets were close to the government's  national  targets (2.06
and 1.19).  Annex 5,  p.2. lists seven indicators (expressed  as targets) which, if met, would
demonstrate "good progress" in  the implementation  of  the Family Welfare Centers project
component.  Two national  CPR  surveys  (to be funded  by USAID)  would  provide  baseline  (1983)  and
progress (1985) data.  A fairly full package of evaluation  surveys  and studies was also provided
(4.04-4.05).
Peru (1982)
This project will strengthen  PHC in four of the country's  health  regions. PHC includes
FP among  its MCH services.  "Specific  operational  targets  have been developed  against  which  the
effectiveness  and impact  of project supported  activities  and services  could be measured  . . ." (6.01).
A one-page  annex lists the targets ("after 5 years of service delivery"), expressed  in percentage
moves up or down, as appropriate. The only FP target used is a percentage  increase  in PP users;
the other 31 targets are all health targets.
Philippines (1974 & 1979)
Pop-I (1974) contains  an 18-pp. demographic  annex  that works out the numbers of
acceptors and continuation  rates (and thus the increase in the CPR) needed to  reach certain
demographic  targets. The latter were defined  by calculating  the Philippine  population  in 2000 (a)
assuming  no significant  change  in the present  high fertility  and (b) assuming  a "moderately  rapid'
(= "reasonable")  decline  in fertlity. The difference  of about  25 million  was taken  as a target number
of births to be averted over the next quarter century. The SAR  judged that "there  is a fair chance
that the target numbers for the program . . . may be  achieved with reasonably moderate
strengthening"  of the program  ("the  program"  referred  to the government  program-some 40 percent
of contraceptors  were receiving  supplies  outside  the program  in 1974, a figure  expected  to rise to
50 percent by 1991.  Thus the government  program  was scaled to accomplish  60 percent of the
target, or 15 mn. averted  births, the other  40 percent  falling  to the  private  sector). A series of tables
in the annex worked  out the continuing  and new acceptors,  and the number  of FP outlets needed,Annex 11. &nopw  of  ^wfetnggjf in past report  45
year-by-year,  1974-1985. It also worked  out the ASFR  and TFP fir  1970-75-80=2000;  under the
target  program  (and  allowing  for the substantial  private-sector  cont-bution),  the  TFR would  fall from
6.4 to 3.8.
In the 1979  SAR the Bank expressed  some reservations  about  the program's  ability  to
meet its increased  targets  of a 50 percent CPR  by 1987  and a slowing  of the population  growth  rate
from 2.5 percent in 1978  to 2.1 percent in '87 and 1.6 percent by 2000.  Major increases  in the
scale, intensity,  and efficiency  of MOH services  would be necessary  to reach these goals.  Pop-II
would  increase  from 33 percent  to 50 percent  the  proportion  of population  reached  by MOH  services.
"Contraceptive  effectiveness"  would  be increased  from 86 percent  in 1978  to 90 percent  in 1982 "by
emphasizing  more effective  and lasting  methods  .
Rwanda (1986  & 1991)
These two projects (both primarily population projects) attempt to help build a population
control  program  in a country  with one of the most pressing  problems  in the world  (in 1989  the TFR
was 8.5, population  was rising at 3.6 percent p.a, and land was becoming  exceedingly  scarce). By
the mid-80's the government  had become convinced  of the need to slow population  and now
supported  PP.  A government  target of increasing  the CPR (0.9 percent in 1986)  to 10 percent  by
1991  was  judged realistic,  although  no significant  reduction  in fertility  could  be expected  until about
2000.  Table 7 in Annex I shows  acceptors, users, and births averted, by year, 1987-91;  these
provide  specific  global targets. Table 8 shows  the 1984 and projected/targ-ted  1991  method  mix.
Table 23 of the same annex is a one-page display of "Key Project Indicators' (13 "process"
indicators  and four "outcome"  indicators,  including  the above-mentioned  CPR) that also serve as
quantitative  targets. The project also funds  a study,  by the national  population  agency,  of acceptors
and their reasons  for continuing  or dropping  out, by method.
SAR-Il  continues  to highlight  the  urgency  of the country's  demographic  situation. Using
simple  projections,  it demonstrates  the time required  for a moderately-rising  CPR to affect  overall
fertility.  Thus under the six-year 1991 project "only the conditions  will be set in place for a
susained reduction  in fertility  and related  improvements  in health  conditions."  The  report  summarizes
the government's  demographic  targets  (3.02)  which  it characterizes  as "extremely  difficult  to achieve
with the time frame allotted." But it goes on to say that the targets "should  provide  an impetus  to
the program,  motivating  providers  and users." To achieve  a reduction  in the TFR from 8.5 in 1985
to 6.4 by 2000 would require a CPR of about 30 percent by 2005 (this result was produced  by
simulations,  using  the Bongaarts  model  - Annex  I shows  the calculations).  The implications  of that
target CPR for the number  of PP users by 1995 and 2000; they imply more than a 200 percent
increase in the number  of users between 1991  and 1995.
Senegal (1982  & 1991)
Pop-I was essentially  a PHC project in which an initial attempt is made to help the
government  extend  FP services  (recently  introduced  as part of a USALD-funded  project)  more  widely
within  the MCH delivery  system. Although  the government  had begun  to show  some interest  in its
population  problem, the new National  Population  Commission  had not yet developed  a population
policy. No demographic  or acceptor  targets are mentioned.
Pop-I (nine  years  later) reflects  a considerable  maturing  of the population  environment.
Projections  of the levels  to which  the CPR should  rise (from 3.4 percent  in '91 to around 14 percent46  Targets  and Indicators  in Bank Population  Projects
in '95 and around 22 percent by 2000) are offered  in effect as targets.  There is no reference  to
demographic  targets. A considerable  program  of population  research  and studies  will  be supported,
including  two iterations  of the 1986  Demographic  and Health Survey  (to be done in '91 and '96).
The DHS studies are expected  to provide monitoring  data on fertility, contraceptive  prevalence,
knowledge  of and attitudes  toward FP, and infant and child mortality. The common  device of a
comprehensive  mid-project  evaluation  is also provided. An eight-page  annex provides  summary
performance  indicators  (few of them quantitative)  for all project components.
Sierra Leone (1986)
A typical  mid-'80s  Africa project where a government  has just begun to recognize  its
population  problem  and the MOH  is just beginning  to offer  FP services,  which are entirely  urban and
led by NGOs.  The project's assistance  in extending fledgling  PP services into MCH facilities
(especially  into an expanded  network of rural PHC clinics) will not do more than "help lay the
foundation for the development of a national population and family planning program.  . . ."  (6.91).
No mention  is made  of any demographic  or acceptor  targets-beyond reporting that  the local  project
preparation  task force recommended  the adoption  of a national population  policy with explicit
demographic  targets (2.29).  A major project aim is to strengthen  the capabilities  of the young
National  Ppulation Commission.
Sri Lanka (1988)
A project with clear, explicit demographic  and global  PP targets in a country with a
quarter-century-old  strong and successful  population  program. Since 1960  the TFR has fallen  from
5.4 to 2.8-3.0 and the CBR has declined  from 38 in the '40s to 24.  The age of marriage  is about
25 for women,  28 for men. A 1987  demographic  and health  survey  (DHS)  estimated  the CPR  at 60-
62 percent, with recent increases  half accounted  for by sterilizations  (mostly  female).  Temporary
methods  are estimated  to rely two-thirds  on traditional methods  (rhythm, withdrawal,etc.);  this
accounts  for one of the project's targets, namely, to raise the CPR for modern methods  from 40
percent to 50 percent.  An explicit set of service and EEC  targets (3.33) is intended  to help the
country reduce the TFR by 0.4  by  1993 (if this is attained, the country would likely reach
replacement  fertility  five years earlier  than the latest projection  showed.
The fact that NRR does not yet equal 1.0 means  that increasing  numbers  of women  are
continuing  to enter their reproductive  years (the annual increase is estimated  at 100,000  fertile
women  through 1993). It will therefore  be difficult  just to maintain  the present  CPR, especially  since
the already-high  sterilization  rate (30 percent)  is threatened  by recent substantial  falls in sterilization
acceptors. So there will have to be increasing  emphasis  on temporary  methods. No method-mix
targets are given, however. Six annual  five-day  "population  strategy  workshops,"  involving  public
and private actors, will  develop  annual  service-delivery  plans (no mention  if those  annual  plans will
include targets, by method ...  .)(3.55 and 3.56).
Thailand (1978)
This SAR has perhaps  the most explicit  set of demographic  and PP targets  of any Bank
report. This was made  possible  by the clarity  of Government  population  policy,  its many years of
a strong and successful  FP program,  and a good data base.  A detailed  13-page  annex  reviews  and
endorses  government  acceptor  targets, which  are spelled  out by method  and province  for each year
of the five-year  project. The demographic  target is to reduce  the rate of population  growth  from 2.5Annce B. Svnopues  of `targeing  in past  reporua  47
percent  to 2.1 percent  by 1981;  this represents  a decline  in the CBR  from 34.5 to 29 and in the CDR
from 8.3 to 8.0.  This target will require the prevention  of 2.6 million  births over the five-year
period. These  demographic  targets  will require  the recruitment  of some  three million  new  acceptors
(600,000  p.a. compared  with an average of 490,000  p.a. during the preceding  five  years), adding
1.6 million  additional  continuing  users by the end of 1981 (3.11 and 4.01).
Togo (1991)
Another  typical  Africa  late-'80s  project where  a Government  has come to acknowledge
its population  program,  has adopted  a formal  population  policy  and program,  and is introducing  FP
services  into  its MCH delivery  system. The  24-page  Annex  reproduces  the new  National  Population
Policy under which the government  wiLl  launch activities 'to  sensitize the general population,
increase  availability  and use of family  planning  services  and improve  PHC services  to combat  high
mortality. These measures  :re critical for setting  and achieving,  in the future, specific  targets to
reduce  fertility"  (para. 71). Later on the SAR  reports  a government  goal  to raise  the CPR from the
present  3 percent l5 percent?]  to 15 percent  by 1995  (para. 83).  Annex 1 (b) lists 22 quantitative
goals (to be reached  by 1995)  of the MCH component  of an expanded  PHC program;  six of the 22
goals are FP targets, i.e.,
i.  promote  a birth-spacing  interval  of at least  two years among  70 percent  of new
mothers,  by 1995;
U.  reduce  the number  of births among  women  under age 20 and over age 35 from
30 percent  in 1990  to 20 percent  by 1995;
in.  reduce  the  percentage  of high  order pregnancies  (more  than six)  from 60 percent
to 50 percent, by 1995;
iv.  reduce maternal  mortality from unwanted  pregnancies  from 16 percent to 8
percent, by 1995;
v.  increase the availability  of services  to women and married couples  from 10
percent to 60 percent, by 1995;
vi.  increase  the use of modern  contraceptive  methods  from 5 percent  to 15 percent,
by 1995;
Trinidad and Tobago (1971)
like  several of the early SARs, this one includes a long (11 pp.) Annex that links
estimates  of acceptors  to births averted and other demographic  outcomes. The Annex's Outline
shows  the calculations  made:
a.  Number  of New Acceptors
(i) Acceptors  in the Postpartum  Program
(ii) Acceptors  in Project  Health Centers
(iii) Acceptors  in Existing  Facilities
(iv) Total New Acceptors
b.  Births Averted
(i) Contraceptive  Methods
(ii) Continuation  Rates
(iii) Women-years  of Protection
(iv) Births averted
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d.  Effect  on the Population  Size  and Growth  Rate
e.  Effect  on the Labor Force
While not labeled  "targets,"  the estimates  are considered  "indicative  of possible  achievements,"
which is what a well-set  target is!
The results of the calculations  are sprinkled  through the SAR and are summarized  in
pam. viii of the "Summary  and Conclusions:"
The project is estimated  to increase  new acceptors  from 10,000  in 1970  to 22,000 per
year from 1980  onwards. As a result  of this, the  birth rate is estimated  to decrease  from
27/1000  in 1969  to 15.5/1000  in 1980.  The rate of population  growth  will be reduced
from a projected  level of 1.5 percent  per year in 1980  without  the project to a level of
0.9 percent with the project.  By the year 2000 the population  would be 6.2 percent
smaller  than othevwise  and the labor force  5.2 percent  smaller.
Tunisia (1971 & 1991)
Tunisia  has much  the stron est  and most successful  FP program  in the Arab  world. The
first Bank  assistance  (1971)  came after he national  program  had been  in existence  nearly five  years.
The SAR contains  a 4-pp. demographic  annex  very similar  to that just reviewed  for Trinidad  and
Tobago. It established  the following  acceptor  and demographic  targets:
On  the demographic  side, the project  should  add 55,000 new  acceptors  to the 1970  level
of 21,300 resulting  in a total of 76,300 new acceptors  a year by 1976.  This would
result in about  21,300 averte; births per year in 1979,  of which 15,300  are attributable
to the proposed project alone ....  The total number of averted births will reach
551,000  by the year  2000. The  effect  of this family  planning  program  would  be to make
the population  about 4.6 percent smaller  than otherwise  in the year 2000, while  that of
the project alone would be to make it 3.2 percent smaller  than otherwise  (6.02 and
6.04).
Based  on its analysis,  the SAR  concludes  that "the  targets  of program  achievement  by the mid-1970's
can be set much  higher than  recent  performance.  " (pam.  v, Summary  and Conclusions).  The SAR's
projections  are treated as targets, with a clear distinction  between  project and program  targets.
Pop-HI  followed  Pop-I by 20 years. The project's objectives  are expressed  in explicit
target terms:
The objectives of the Population  and  Family Health project are to  increase the
Contraceptive  Prevalence  Rate (CPR)  from  40 percent  to 45 percent  and to improve  the
health status of the population,  especially  of women  and children  in rural areas. These
objectives  would  be pursued through  two strategies:
a.  strengthening  of  family planning and maternal and child health services
(FP/MCH)  within  an improved  Basic  Health  Care (BBC)  package;
b.  targeting BBC for population  groups with the highest fertility and mortality
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While other projects have also used group targeting  in project design, Pop-IH  is more explicit in
saying so.  The SAR states that 'The target number  of women to be served will be set by the
[ONFPJ  . . . to meet the national  target to increase  the CPR (for modem methods)  from 40 to 45
percent  by 1996. The specific  targets  per governorate  will be agreed  upon by the Regional  Health
Directors  and approved  by the Project Steering  Committee  in the context of the Yearly  Resource
Allocation  and  Implementation  Plans" (2.5).  The report makes no reference to  targets by
contraceptive  method.
Pop-i makes  use of one other  kind of target not seen in any of the other  75 SARs:  the
number  of consultations  for PP per Married  Woman  of Fertile Age. The project would raise this
figure  from a current  level of 0.23 to 0.6, which "is adequate  for IUD and oral contraceptive  users."
As there are large regional  variations  in this norm, "the  project's focus  on underserved  areas  would
significantly  narrow these disparities." With an expected  doubling of pre-natal and post-natal
consultations,  it will help  identify  high-risk  pregnancies  and reduce  maternal  and neo-natal  mortality
(5.1).
Yemen  Arab Republic (1990)
This is a second  health-sector  develormnent  project, the first (1983)  having  experienced
great difficulties  in implementation.  Although  the SAR reports  on the country's demographic  and
PP situation  (very bad demographic  numbers, very little FP), the project has no population  or PP
objectives  or targets, explicit  or implicit. 'Direct policies  with quantitative  demographic  targets  for
population  growth  rates are deemed  unacceptable."  (1.07). The SAR notes that "The Government
supports  maternal and child health programs, family planning  training and services, and public
information." However,  there is no reference  to PP in the description  of the health services, or
training activities,  whose  expansion  the project  will support.
Zimbabwe (1986 & 1991)
These two projects, and their respective  SARs, are very similar.  They are set in a
country  with a relatively  high per capita  income (for Africa),  where fertlity has already  started to
deciine  (the  only such country  in Southern  Africa),  and whose  government  is strongly  supportive  of
slowing  population  growth  even  though  it does  not yet have  a document  formally  stating  its policies.
Both projects  choose  a set of under-served  districts  for extension  of MCH/FP services. Both have
population  and PP as primary  project  objectives. Both  have explicit  demographic  and PP targets.
Pop-I  acceps the governent's  FP target for the project area: "The  target contraceptive
prevalence  rate for the eight districts by the end of the project is about 50 percent-a  target
considerably  above the present estimated rate of about 20 percent in these districts, but not
unreasonably  high in light of Zimbabwe's  achievements  since  Independence  and the inputs  througb
the project ....  If achieved,  there would  be approximately  136,000  PP acceptors  in the eight
districts  in 1991,  compared  with approximately  55,000  if the present  contraceptive  prevalence  rate
were to remain constant. Similar  calculations  can be made for the other MCH interventions  . . .'
(6.04).  The project will fund a baseline survey, plus a second survey in its third year, "and the
targets would  again be reviewed  and revised  if approprate" (3.04).
In addition  to monitodring  progress  towards  meeting  its outcome  targets, Po-I  makes
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workers year by year; the use of mass media by the EEC  unit; the production  of manuals  and
booklets;  and the holding  of planned  training  workshops.
Pop-H  covers 16  under-served  districts,  and involves  six donors. Its design  is explicitly
linked  to an analysis  of lessons  learned  in implementing  Pop-I  (which  had gone well). Pop-IH  carries
quantitative  targeting  somewhat  beyond  the level of Pop-I. It endorses,  for example,  the series of
nationwide  "process  indicators"  developed  by the government  to monitor  WPP/N status  and service
delivery. These  are:
(a)  lowering  the infant mortality  rate from 53 in 1990 to 43 in 1996;
(b)  increasing  the percentage  of children  receiving  the complete  vaccination  course,
at the correct age/interval,  from 70 percent  in 1990  to 85 percent in 1996;
(c)  reducing  the share of children  aged 6-36 months who are malnourished  (less
than 80 percent of the reference  weight  for age) from 12 percent in 1990  to 5
percent in 1996;
(d)  increasing  the percentage  of pregnant  women  receiving  antenatal  care from 90
percent in  1990 to 95 percent by 1996 and increasing  the percentage who
deliver in a health facility  from 70 percent  to 85 percent;
(e)  lowering  the total fertility  rate from 5.5 in 1986  to 4.5 in 1996,  and raising  the
percentage  of married women  of reproductive  age using modern methods  of
contraception  from 36 percent  to 48 percent;
(f)  increasing the percentage of married women using permanent and semi-
permanent  methods  from 4 percent in 1988  to 12 percent in 1996;
(g)  training 3,500 nurses  and 120 doctors  in family  planning;
(h)  increasing the proportion  of nurses in district and rural service trained in
midwifery  to 60 percent  by 1996;
(i)  increasing  the level of cost recovery  by MOH from 3 percent of recurrent
budget expenditures in  1990 to  at  least  10 percent by  July  1,  1995.
Government's  annual  target  increases  will  be monitored  during implementation.
The SAR goes on to note that,  "For each of the project objectives  and related components/
subcomponents  a more detailed  set of progress  indicators  has been elaborated. In many  cases, the
provincial  and district health planning  teams  have developed  their own targets" (3.2).
Annex  2 contains  a fuller statement  of the government's  national  FP strategy. This
includes  two 'goals" and seven subsidiary  "objectives."  Included  is a table showing  1995  national
targets  for numbers  of PP users, by method  and by source  of service. No comparable  table is given
for the 16 project districts, however.
Annex  Im.  Treatment  of Targets and Indicators  in PCRs and PPARs
The Bank requires that a  Project Completion Report (PCR) be  written by  the
implementing  division  within nine months  of final disbursement.  These reports  are usually  written
by one or more of the individuals  who have been involved  in supervising  the project, although  the
authors may  not have been around  when  the project  was under design. PCRs are then reviewed  by
the (independent)  Operations  Evaluation  Department  (OED)  which, upon approving  the document,
sends  it to the Bank's Board. OED must  then also  decide whether  or not it will conduct  a separate,
independent  audit (i.e., a comprehensive  review  and evaluation,  not a financial  audit).  Audits  areAnnx  CX.  area#nei  of targets  and indicators  in PCRs and PPAMs  51
done on only a sample  of all PCRs -in  the past, about  one-third  of all PCRs have  been  selected  for
audit. Project  Performance  Audit Reviews  (PPARs  or PARs)  are conducted  by OED  staff members
or outside consultants; no one from the division responsible for the project participates in the OED
review. The  intent is to conduct  an independent  review,  free of the biases  and temptations  to "cover
up" or "excuse"  which might rob a PCR of objectivity.
PARs  use the PCRs as their  starting-point,  then  construct  whatever  ldnd of review  OED
thinks appropriate. The wrting of both PCRs and PARs  involve  field  visits; both are circulated  in
draft to the borrower (and often  to co-financiers)  for comment. The PARs  normally  pay somewhat
less attention to project implementation  matters than PCRs io,  and more to project design and
impacts. PARs  result in a Project  Audit  Review  Memorandum  which is circulated  to the Board  and
placed in a bound file in the OED library; PARs are not published,  however.  Memorandums
(typically  10-20  pp. in length)  invariably  include  the full  text of the PCR (of comparable  length,  plus
frequent  annexes). Unlike  Appraisal  Reports,  the authors  of PCRs and PARs  are not identified. For
credibility,  one relies on the quality  of the review  and the majesty  of impersonality.
Of the 75 population  projects approved  by the Board to the end of 1991, 28 had been
completed  long enough to have had their PCRs written.  Eighteen  PCRs had been selected  for
PARs, and  the  Reviews completed, by  Feb.  1,  1992.  The  28  completed PCR cover
population/health  projects  in 16 countries,  reflecting  coverage  of two or more  projects  in nine  of the
countries. There is a clustering  of PARs in '81-82 (five)  and, especially,  in '85-86 (seven).
The  summaries  below  extract  comments  on targets  and indicators  from PCRs and PARs
for 14 of the 16  countries  for which  PARs  exist  to date (reports  on the  two omitted  countries  covered
failed  projects  that had nothing  to contribute-not even  the study  of their failures). The documents
provide a good historical  record of project implementation  (usually  of implementation  difficulties)
and  of initial results, or  impacts, with the PARs offering  judgments on project design and
explanations  of delays  and impacts,  or the lack thereof. They  do not have  much  to teU  us, however,
about targets and indicators  that we have not already learned from our review  of SARs  and other
sources.
Bangladesh (PAR  # 6303, June 1986)
The PAR on the first of the Bank's four Bangladesh  projects arrived at a general
conclusion  that the project had been too complex, was insufficiently  focused, was too big, and
required an 'enormous"  supervision  effort (which  it praised).  It noted that "  . . . although  it is
impossible  to estimate  causal links between  project inputs and program results, it is important  to
assess  the results of the overall  population  program  .... " Both the PCR and the PAR agreed  that
"the  major  contribution  of the project was  in developing  a population  program  in Bangladesh."  The
PAR  noted  that OED  had used this project  as a case study  in a special  review  it had made  of project
supervision. That study  noted  the difficulty  the project  had experienced  in establishing  a monitoring
system-five years after the project's start, "a system  for monitoring  the impact  of the project  had
still not been satisfactorily  established."
The PCR for the second  project  reviewed  the successive  reductions  in the Government's
demographic  and contraceptive  targets. Tables  are included  showing  trends  in the CPR, by method,
1975-85. It noted  that the Government  and donors  were now  in agreement  on the key demographic
and CPR targets,  including  the need  for stronger  emphasis  on temporary  methods  of birth-prevention
(which  recruit younger  couples  before  they opt for sterilization)  if the demographic  goals  were to be52  Targets  and Indicators  in Bank Popukltion  Projects
met.  The PCR was reporting  trends in key (program,  not project)  indicators  and on agreed broad
program  targets.
Dominican  Republic (PAR # 5596, April 198S)
The Review  judged the project successful  in terms of "fostering  a sound population
policy through the strengthening  of primary health services."  The project's precise  demographic
impact "cannot  be measured,"  however,  despite  original  intentions  to do so.  National  fertility  has
been falling, and "the  project's  likely impact  probably  comes  reasonably  close"  to the original  intent
that it should account for one-quarter  of the national decline.  There is no discussion  of the
methodological  difficulties  which  prevented  a closer  linkage  of the project's contribution  to national
trends.
Egypt (PAR # 4144, October 1982)
The Bank/borrower  relationship  was a difficult  one from the start. The project set no
quantitative  objectives:  its main  objective  was "The  development  of a mutually  satisfactory  long-term
relationship"  (the  SAR  had actually  recommended  against  the project "because  it would  have  too little
demographic  impactl" The PCR and Review  abundantly  confirm  that predicted  outcome).
Despite the difficult  relationship,  a  second project was signed before the first had
finished.  The second project did set acceptor and CPR targets.  Subsequent  surveys reported
conflicting  trends, making  it impossible  to know  what  was  happening. The second  project  fared  little
better  than the first, becoming  a "problem  project"  almost  from its start, and being  canceled  in year
7 because  of poor progress. The PCR concluded  that the Government  was not much  interested  in
population  and the Ministry  of Health  not much  interested  in famnily  planning. So, the Review  noted,
the Bank must pursue  dialogue  through  other channels.
India (PAR # 3748, January  1982;  PAR R 8896, June 1990)
The first project (1973-80)  showed  little  or no concern  for targets  but the Review  noted
that acceptor results in the two project states were somewhat  better than in non-project  areas.
Perhads more important,  the project provided  key ideas for the Government's  Model Plan, and
"invented," and established, the two Population  Centers (PCs), in Bangalore  and Lucknow,  to
conduct  operational  research. The project left it up to the new  PCs to develop  an appropriate  set of
indicators  for this and other  projects.
The PCR and PAR for the second  project used standard  PP indicators  to demonstrate
that, contrary  to expecttions, performance  in the project  districts  was no better than ;a non-project
districts.  Boa- reviews concluded  that the Bank's typical area-by-area  approach  in India was not
likely to show above-average  results unless the Government  could change  some national  program
policies. The PAR faulted the Bank for not undertaking  sector work that might have led to such
policy  changes.
As for Bank  attention  to indicators,  the PAR noted  the attention  given  them in the SAR
but also noted that the surveys  on which they heavily  depended  (to be carried out by the two PCs
mentione4  above)  were not very satisfactory. "The  vital rate  reported  were questionable,  and in a
number  of instances  differences  between  baseline  and mid-term  estimates  seemed  quite  unlikely."Annex ml.  Treabun* of  targets and indicators in PCRs and PPARs  53
Indonesia (PAR # 5675, May 1985;  PAR # 6276, June 1986)
These two Reviews again make the point that project accomplishments  cannot be
objectively  judged unless project indicators  are specified  in advance. The first Review  makes  the
point summarily-and promises a more elaborate  discussion  in Review  no. 2, which is in fact
presented. Review  no. I cannot  accept  the PCR's  claim  that "the  project  has undoubtedly  succeeded
in meeting  its ambitious  objectives: contraceptive  acceptance  targets have been exceeded,  family
planning  is no longer  considered  an especially  sensitive  issue on religious  or political  grounds  and
the total fertilty rate has been considerably  reduced."
Neither in the PCR nor in the appraisal  report is there a specific  framework  or set of
indicators on the basis of which causal relationships  can be established  between  the
project's stated objectives  on the one hand and project activities  on the other.  As a
result, there is no hard "causal"  evidence  as to the extent  that "micro"  project  activities
contributed  to "macro"  project  objectives.  This point  has been  elaborated  upon  in earlier
audits  and will be pursued  in the audit of the Second  Population  Project.
The Review  of the second  project  attempts  to spell  out what OED means  when  it refers
(as it repeatedly  has done) to the need for "a hierarchy  of objectives  and targets  to make  evaluation
of population  programs  and projects  more meaningfil  ...  .n Indeed,  the PAR suggests  "that PHN
develop  such an evaluation  methodology  soon."  The two-page  effort to lead PHN down this path
is unsatisfying,  however. The advice given is more hortatory  than specific  and practical.  This
disappointment  does not invalidate  the Review's  basic  advice  that PHN  needs to work  up a better set
of project indicators  (an effort  to which the present  paper may contribute).
The  PCR for the  Third Population  Project  offers  the following  comments  on the "project
indicators"  problem:
As  stated ...  direct relationships  between  project inputs  and fertlity decline  cannot  be
demonstrated.  The appraisal  stated  that Population  m would  assist the GOI to achieve
its interim  goal  of reducing  the 1979  TFR from 4.8 to 3.5 in 1984. There is an ongoing
debate  whether  more monitorable  and direct indicators  should  be used to assess  project
impact  rather than  using  outcome  indicators  such as reductions  in fertility  and mortality
. . . . The project design  would have benefitted  from a greater emphasis  on process
indicators  and a systematic  listing  of when  certain  indicators  should  be monitored  during
project supervision. Additional  impact  indicators  to be included  in the project design
would be contraceptive  prevalence  rates and number  of current users during  each year
of project  implementation.  A small  survey  towards  the end of the project,  focusing  on
knowledge,  attitudes and practices, and designed  to produce results comparable  to
surveys  previously  undertaken,  would  have provided  an evaluation  of some aspect of
immediate  project impact.
Jamaica  (PAR # 2S80,  June 1979; PAR # 5589,  April 1985)
1.  PAR 2580 was OED's first review  of a population  project (the Bank's first in this
sector). The Review  said nothing  about  targets  and indicators. The second  Review  had much  to say,
however. It began by expressing  the view that project performance  would  have been better if the
project had set  "realistic objectives"  and had specified "performance  indicators to assess the54  Targets  and Indisetors  in Bank Populaton Projects
effectiveness  of project strategy."  Instead,  OED noted, the SAR used program  objectives  to justify
future project performance. But these are
unrealistic  yardsticks  . . . because  program  goals are achieved  by multiple  Government
and  non-Govermnent  interventions  and  efforts by other donor agencies, and  are
influenced  by socio-economic  development  in general. The Second  Population  Project
is only one component  of the Governmet's ...  efforts. Even  if program  objectives  are
being achieved,  it would be difficult  to establish  the causal link between  results and
program  achievements.
During  project design, quantifiable  goals to measure  the outcome  of the various  project
strategies . . . were not stated.  In the absence of such quantifiable targets and related
indicators,  real project achievement  and impact  could not be assessed. To what extent
project strategies have been effectively  implemented  becomes  a matter of subjective
judgment,  always  open  to debate. More  objective  measurement  of strategy  performance
would  be preferable.
The Review  then goes on to make these  suggestions:
Even if program  objectives  need  to be specified  as part of project  justification,  the audit
suggests that during project preparation  a  clear hierarchy of project objectives  be
established: program objectives, strategy performance indicators and  physical
implementation  and utilization  targets.  Indicators  at the delivery  and the institutional
levels will both assist in linking  project impact  to the overall  program  goals as well as
provide  guidance  as to what type of data need to be collected,  processed  and analyzed
for purposes  of management  information  and project  impact  evaluation.
W"ith  reference  to institutional  development,  the objectives  should  be stated keeping  in
mind  the time frame necessary for bringing about organizational changes ....
A few comments  on OED's suggestions  may be in order.  Establishing 'program
objectives' normally  presents  no problems-higher CPR (using  modern  methods)  and a falling TFR
are standard, valid goals.  But a question arises whether or not these same 'output" goals should be
applied  at the project level, using  the same  sample-survey  techniques  used to measure  national  (=
program)  performance). The answer  would  seem to depend  on how  sharply a project's catchment
area can be separated  out from the rest of the program.  I have not identified  any Bank project
where special surveys  have been conducted  to get this kind of outcome  data at the project level (a
few projects, e.g. in India,  have compared  project with national  performance  using service-statistic
data, which measure  earlier-stage  performance,  not demographic  results).
We  come  next  to  [project]  "strategy performance indicators" and  'physical
implementation  and utilization  targets." I am not sure what these  two sets mean. I would  prefer to
separate out "physical  implementation'  targets, which are almost always adequately  covered by
supervision  reports on the project implementation  stage.  Facility  utilization  seems a particularly
important, and  widely neglected, indicator.  Establishing utilization standards is  the  key
problem-some combination  of "capacity,"  trends, and comparison  with comparable  facilities is
usually feasible.  "Utilization"  of clinics is of course a neutral measure of 'activity," revealing
nothing  about  results, e.g. acceptance  or termination  of contraception  (intermediate  outputs). Service
statistics (which are essentially  the same for any clinic, whether  it be offering  pu.-e  health, pumAnnx  M. 7eatme  of targets  and  lndicators in PCRs and PPAr  s5
population,  or mixed  services)  can  provide  aU  the needed  activity  indicators  and at least some  useful
contraceptive  output data.  What is needed, in my view, is agreement  on the main classes of
performance  indicators  and a listing  of the data-requirements  for each  class of indicator. I have  tried
to provide  such a framework  in the Conclusions  and Recommendations  section  of the main text.
Kenya (PAR # 3536, June 1981)
This early PAR was done in the gloomy  days when all government/donor  population
efforts  were being met with perverse  results-rising fertility  and acceptor  rates far short of targets.
The PAR noted  these  disappointing  results  and that the project  was  not designed  to generate  data  that
might explain them.  The PCR did note, however,  that program  acceptor  targets were based on
Asian norms, which proved "unrealisticaUy  high."
We know today  that by the end of the '80s the demand for FP services  has shot up
higher and faster than anyone  bad expected,  for reasons  not yet well understood. One wishes  one
could say that the success  of the lat'80s  has reflected  changes  in the national  program made in
response  to analyses  (by the Bank and others) of program  weaknesses  earlier in the decade. Any
such claim would require a detailed analysis  of multiple  reports and subsequent  adjustments  in
program  content.
Korea (PAR # 8895, June 1990)
This PAR is useful because  of its graphical presentation of 15-25  year trends in the
overaUl  CPR (urban, rual, total-a  seven-fold  rise from about 10 percent  in 1964  to over 70 percent
in 1985),  the CPR by method  (it shows  the over five-fold  explosion  in sterilizations  after 1975,  with
continuing  high  use of birth-spacing  methods  by younger  couples),  and the  steady  decline  in the TFR
(from 6.0 in 1960  to 2.1 by 1985).
The PAR is skeptical  that the project (1980-87)  made any major contribution  to the
strong national  trends.  Socio-economic  developments  generated  by Korea's remarkable  economic
growth doubtless  played a much stronger  role, leading  to widespread  reliance on non-government
sources of FP advice and supplies. Utilization  of project facilities,  while showing  some increase
dung  the project period,  was  judged lower  than expected  and well  below  capacities. If the project
had come a decade earlier, before people had the incomes  to visit private providers, it might
reasonably  have claimed  a larger conttibution  to the national  trends.
MNlaysia  (PAR #  641, May, 1985)
This PAR appears to have been written by the same author who wrote the one for
Jamaica  (see above). He makes  precisely  the same  criticism,  namely,  that project impact  cannot  be
assessed  because  the SAR established  indicators  only for the national  program, not for the project
itself. The author  then pleads  for exactly  the same  set of project yardsticks  also found lacldng  in the
Jamaica  project:
A hierarchy of project objectives  should be establshed at the time of appraisal of
population  projects indicating  (i) national  family planning  program goals; (*d)  project
strategy  performance  indicators;  and (id) physical  implementation  and utilization  targets.
There should  be a distinction  between  long-term,  medium-term  and short-term  goals of
the project.  Similarly, for institutional  strengthening  (of major importance in this56  Target and Indicators  in Bank Popido4on  Projects
project),  outcomes  to be expected  once  the insttutions  are developed  and the time frame
needed  for institutional  development  should  be specified.
These  are right insdacts  but not  as operationally  transparent  as one might hope. Does
a short-term  project goal mean getting the buildings  built, equipped,  and staffed?  A medium-term
goal to achieve  rising utilization  and acceptor  rates?  A long-term  goal (over  5-10 years after project
completion?)  to maintain  dhe  facilities  and reduce  the  fertility  of those who  use them?  Does this mean
ample surveys,  two  or three  years after  project  completion,  to establish  CPRs  and TFRs  for project-
only users?  And is progress towards institutional  goals susceptible  of  measurement  through
regularly-collected  periodic indicators-or  perhaps better through occasional ad hoc  reviews
(including  reviews  conducted  in the course  of preparing  repeater  projects)?
OED reviews and judgments deserve a high place on the agenda of professional
discussion  about  how to assess  the worthwhileness  of Bank  population  projects-but no more. They
do not deserve  any extra-ordinary  deference  simply  because  they represent  the Bank's 'judgment  of
last resort" in a sequence  of formal  procedures. Whether  or not PARs  add significantly  to the data
and insights  of PCRs is a separate, important  issue. My own  view, based solely  on my reading  of
the 18 population  PARs  done to date, is that the cost of conducting  PARs  far exceeds  their benefits.
There  is simply  too much  duplication  between  the two sets  of reports  to justify  continuing  to do both.
The Bank  would  learn far more about  how  to improve  the design  of population  projects  if it stopped
doing PARs and devoted  those resources  to ad hoc operational  research  and to external  reviews  of
national  population  programs. OED is said to be moving  cautiously  in this direction,  at least in the
population  sector.
Philippines (PAR  # 5544, March  1985;  PAR  # 9380, February 1991)
Government  interest in EP has never been strong, and steadily  weakened  during the
course of two Bank projects.  This dominant  political  fact presented  so many  problems  for usefiu
dialogue  and for project implementation  that one wonders  why  OED  considered  either of the projects
worth auditing. For our purposes  the only relevant  part of either Review  is the lament, in the first
Review,  that the Bank  decided not to undertake  a survey  on the use of project facilities  which had
been  part of the original project.  That, said the Review,  was a mistake. With utilization  reviews
as rare as they are, this might have  provided  a usefil model.
Thailand (PAR  # 733S, June 1988)
Tbis Review  concludes  with an observation  close to those noted in the Jamaica and
Malaysia  Reviews:
Evaluation  of population  projects is inherently  difficult  but would be  facilitated  if
objectives  were clearly  formulated  and linked  with program  objectives. A hierarchy  of
program, project, impact  and process  objectives  is needed,  together  with clear targets
for project components.
Tralded and Tobago (PAR # 3687, December 1981)
This early Bank  project, begun  just before  the oil boom of the early '70s, encountered
many  implementation  ditfficulties,  and the national  program  badly  missed  the acceptor  targets  set for
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...  It is difficult to escape the conclusion that the national program should have done
very much  better.  Government  commitment  has weakened  steadily.  Management  has
been weak at the central  and county  levels.  Although  ...  the more efficient  private
Family  Planning  Association  has had to curtail  its operations,  in 1979  ths FPA recruited
at least half as many new acceptors  with only two clinics as all of the 86 government
oenters  combined.
The PAR  does not conclude  that the project  should  not have  gone forward. It says  only
that it should  have been a somewhat  different  kind of project-and perhaps should not have been
approved  until  the government  had demonstrated  stronger  commitment  by remedying  the institutional
weaknesses  which later hobbled  project implementation.  The PAR did not address, however,  the
following  critical  point, drawn  not from the PAR  but from the PCR:
It must be remembered  that in the years following  1968, the Bank, in the light of the
position taken by Mr. McNamara  at the 1968 Annual Meeting and on subsequent
occasions,  regarded  it as its duty  to draw  the attention  of member  countries  to the threat
to development  posed by rapid growth  of population  and to encourage  them to take
active steps to check this growth.  It achieved  positive responses, such as that of
Trinidad  and Tobago,  to Mr. McNamara's  initiative,  and felt that it should  go out of its
way to foster the interest thus displayed. The Bank's willingness  to make the loan at
an early stage  of the project  cycle  reflected  this attitude. This, like many  first projects,
was intended  to initiate  and sustain  a sectoral  dialogue  between  the Government  and the
Bank.
In short, the Bank's speculative  investment  in "dialogue' often has to be accepted,  in
many of the Bank's early projects,  as the basic project  justification. No amount  of disappointment
thrown  up by weak performance  indicators  could  justify an ex post judgment  that the project  should
not have gone forward (as noted, the PAR does not contain any such judgment).  One can
legitimately  wonder, however, how well Bank staff make the judgment as to whether or not a
proposed  project, in a given situation,  will produce  a dialogue  worth having. In the present  case,
there seems  general agreement  that no one could  have foreseen  the rapid worsening  of the project
environment  that set in shortly after the project was launched.  So there was very litle  useful
dialogue, and lots of bad numbers.
Tunisia (PAR 5135, June 1984)
The PAR  on the  first of two  projects  notes  that project  design  included  good  specification
of project indicators.  At time of writing, however, these had proved of little use because the
management  information  system (MIS)  had developed  too slowly  to generate  indicator  data.  The
PCR for the second  project ('81-89) noted  the system's  continuing  inability  to develop  a meaningful
MIS system. The project did include  explicit  PP targets, based on the major project objective  of
integrating  the vertical  PP delivery  system  into  the Ministry  of Health's  Basic  Health  System  (BHS).
Since the integration  failed to take place, it was clear that the targets (based  on the unrealized  BHS
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